December 7, 1941

[Corp000085]

A day that will live in infamy.

 

RIP

[Gugny]

RIP

[Pine Barrens Mafia]

God bless all the families of those who died.

[Steve O]

Some Gave All

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9BSMDcg27k

Edited December 7, 2016 by Steve O

[dib]

A day that will live in infamy.

 

RIP

A DATE which will live in Infamy.

 

"I fear we have awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve"

 

My father in law, a Marine pilot, flew one of the 'Japanese' aircraft in the movie Tora Tora Tora.

[Fadingpain]

A DATE which will live in Infamy.

 

"I fear we have awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve"

 

My father in law, a Marine pilot, flew one of the 'Japanese' aircraft in the movie Tora Tora Tora.

Interesting about your father in law!

 

Fun fact: Isoroku Yamamoto studied at Harvard, spoke fluent English, enjoyed American culture, was opposed to any war with the USA, and did 2 stints as a naval attache in Washington, DC.

 

Oddly enough, I am currently working on a 1:350 scale model of the IJN Hiryu, one of the six Japanese carriers used in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

 

For such an infamous event that will be remembered forever, it is interesting to note that only about 3,500 were killed or wounded in the entire thing...the aging battle wagons that were damaged or sunk were not much of a loss strategically speaking, several were repaired and made seaworthy again, and the Japanese got no aircraft carriers which would have been the big catch.

 

Six months later at the Battle of Midway, we would send four Japanese carriers to the bottom of the Pacific and they could never recover from that loss.

 

Some may want to read up on Wade McClusky, who played a pivotal role in the Battle of Midway.

 

Aside from having giant balls of steel, his personal decision making and hunch based on a nose for tactics directly led to the sinking of IJN Kaga and Akagi, 2 of the 4 carriers lost.

 

He was from Buffalo, NY.

[Pine Barrens Mafia]

Interesting about your father in law!

 

Fun fact: Isoroku Yamamoto studied at Harvard, spoke fluent English, enjoyed American culture, was opposed to any war with the USA, and did 2 stints as a naval attache in Washington, DC.

 

Oddly enough, I am currently working on a 1:350 scale model of the IJN Hiryu, one of the six Japanese carriers used in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

 

For such an infamous event that will be remembered forever, it is interesting to note that only about 3,500 were killed or wounded in the entire thing...the aging battle wagons that were damaged or sunk were not much of a loss strategically speaking, several were repaired and made seaworthy again, and the Japanese got no aircraft carriers which would have been the big catch.

 

Six months later at the Battle of Midway, we would send four Japanese carriers to the bottom of the Pacific and they could never recover from that loss.

 

Some may want to read up on Wade McClusky, who played a pivotal role in the Battle of Midway.

 

Aside from having giant balls of steel, his personal decision making and hunch based on a nose for tactics directly led to the sinking of IJN Kaga and Akagi, 2 of the 4 carriers lost.

 

He was from Buffalo, NY.

 

Also of note was the national resolve to eradicate our enemy. Thank god 1940s America wasn't as pussified as 2000s America.

[boyst]

'Murika. !@#$ yeah.

[Fadingpain]

 

 

There were some Curtiss P-40s stationed on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

 

A few got airborne and even scored a few aerial kills.

 

Those were made at Curtiss on Elmwood Avenue, in the giant building that used to be (and may still be) the "BAC" or some such...Buffalo Athletic Club? I played tennis and racket ball in there several times many years ago. Have no idea if it is still in business.

 

Kind of across from WIVB/WBEN as I recall.

[DC Tom]

Interesting about your father in law!

 

Fun fact: Isoroku Yamamoto studied at Harvard, spoke fluent English, enjoyed American culture, was opposed to any war with the USA, and did 2 stints as a naval attache in Washington, DC.

 

He was also a very good poker player, and lost two fingers at Tsushima. And threatened resignation if he didn't get his way with Pearl Harbor and Midway.

 

 

...the aging battle wagons that were damaged or sunk were not much of a loss strategically speaking, several were repaired and made seaworthy again, and the Japanese got no aircraft carriers which would have been the big catch.

 

 

SO inaccurate. I know it's the standard popular interpretation...but it's just so wrong. I wish I had space to explain it...

 

I've mentioned this before: I always wanted to write a book about the Pearl Harbor battle line. Seven of the ships were recovered. Six were rebuilt, Five of those six fought the last surface action between battleships at Surigaio Straits. I always thought it was an interesting story: the battle line sunk and disabled, salvaged, rebuilt, and fights its way across the Pacific to defeat the Japanese fleet.

 

 

Those were made at Curtiss on Elmwood Avenue, in the giant building that used to be (and may still be) the "BAC" or some such...Buffalo Athletic Club? I played tennis and racket ball in there several times many years ago. Have no idea if it is still in business.

 

Little known fact: between Curtiss and Bell, Buffalo was something like the tenth largest center of combat aircraft production in the world during World War 2. (It would have been larger, except Consolidated moved to Southern California in the mid-30s.) And most of the aircraft produced went to the Soviet Union.

 

And Curtiss made some of the worst planes of the war, as well. The SB3C Helldiver killed the company (the Navy refused to buy any planes from Curtiss post-war, because of that fiasco). The SO3C Seamew was so stupid-awful it was funny.

[CowgirlsFan]

May we never forget.

[DC Tom]

May we never forget.

 

Forget what? The sinking of Force Z? The attack on Hong Kong?

[dib]

 

Forget what? The sinking of Force Z? The attack on Hong Kong?

we did forget 9/11 was a reminder

[Augie]

Interesting about your father in law!

 

Fun fact: Isoroku Yamamoto studied at Harvard, spoke fluent English, enjoyed American culture, was opposed to any war with the USA, and did 2 stints as a naval attache in Washington, DC.

 

Oddly enough, I am currently working on a 1:350 scale model of the IJN Hiryu, one of the six Japanese carriers used in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

 

For such an infamous event that will be remembered forever, it is interesting to note that only about 3,500 were killed or wounded in the entire thing...the aging battle wagons that were damaged or sunk were not much of a loss strategically speaking, several were repaired and made seaworthy again, and the Japanese got no aircraft carriers which would have been the big catch.

 

Six months later at the Battle of Midway, we would send four Japanese carriers to the bottom of the Pacific and they could never recover from that loss.

 

Some may want to read up on Wade McClusky, who played a pivotal role in the Battle of Midway.

 

Aside from having giant balls of steel, his personal decision making and hunch based on a nose for tactics directly led to the sinking of IJN Kaga and Akagi, 2 of the 4 carriers lost.

 

He was from Buffalo, NY.

My father-in-law was a dentist on the USS Missouri when the peace treaty was signed. There was a scale model of the Missouri on the family room mantle that he was very proud of. Shortly before our marriage 30+ years ago, I reached for and picked up the model, assuming is was secured to the block of wood upon which it sat. Thinking back, it must have been after the wedding, because I am married and have been for a long time. That was a bad day.

[Simon]

 

He was also a very good poker player, and lost two fingers at Tsushima. And threatened resignation if he didn't get his way with Pearl Harbor and Midway.

 

 

 

I've always wondered how things might have played out had Yamamoto maintained the initiative by pressing his advantage and also why exactly he didn't. The harbor was a smoking wreck and the islands were wide open; what a bizarre time to bug out.

How would the remainder of the Pacific Fleet have reacted? Would Nimitz have been out of the chain of command? Would the Combined Fleet been able to maintain any kid of supply line?

I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on that if you ever have the time or inclination.

[dib]

My mother installed landing lights in the P-40, my dad served in the CBI theater of war

 

 

 

Little known fact: between Curtiss and Bell, Buffalo was something like the tenth largest center of combat aircraft production in the world during World War 2. (It would have been larger, except Consolidated moved to Southern California in the mid-30s.) And most of the aircraft produced went to the Soviet Union.

 

And Curtiss made some of the worst planes of the war, as well. The SB3C Helldiver killed the company (the Navy refused to buy any planes from Curtiss post-war, because of that fiasco). The SO3C Seamew was so stupid-awful it was funny.

[DC Tom]

 

I've always wondered how things might have played out had Yamamoto maintained the initiative by pressing his advantage and also why exactly he didn't. The harbor was a smoking wreck and the islands were wide open; what a bizarre time to bug out.

 

 

Except that wasn't the Japanese objective. The attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't even the main attack, it was a sideshow. Their main axis of advance was south to the East Indies, which is why they attacked Malaya, Borneo, and the Philippines first - to secure the flanks of the advance and isolate the DEI from any help. The attack on Pearl was just a deep raid to protect the left flank while the main fleet was engaged elsewhere.

 

Plus, like you implied...logistics would have killed them. I'd have to look the exact numbers up (I have them somewhere), but Japanese shipping was stretched to the maximum from the start - they had to borrow from the merchant fleet to achieve all their initial objectives on December 8, which meant they were mortgaging their basic economic needs for military purposes. To support three more divisions three thousand miles from anywhere in a place that was fundamentally unimportant to them (there was no economic reason to take Hawaii) would have required shipping they didn't have, and that's even before they started incurring shipping losses.

 

Really, the Japanese had no business fighting a war with anyone larger than Italy. Their military preparedness (which was considerable) masks their economic unpreparedness, which was stunning.

[Simon]

 

Except that wasn't the Japanese objective. The attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't even the main attack, it was a sideshow. Their main axis of advance was south to the East Indies, which is why they attacked Malaya, Borneo, and the Philippines first - to secure the flanks of the advance and isolate the DEI from any help. The attack on Pearl was just a deep raid to protect the left flank while the main fleet was engaged elsewhere.

 

I just find it hard to believe that the timeline on their strategic objective was so tight that they couldn't make any adjustment to take advantage of an enormous tactical advantage that was staring them in the face. If they had hung around for another 36 hours or so, they might have been able to do so much damage to the infrastructure at Pearl (as well as Hickam and Wheeler) that the Pacific Fleet may well have never recovered enough to be a decisive factor. In the hindsight of amateurs, it just seems like a golden opportunity cast aside in the name of mindless rigidity.

 

 

Really, the Japanese had no business fighting a war with anyone larger than Italy. Their military preparedness (which was considerable) masks their economic unpreparedness, which was stunning.

 

There's always been something hilariously ironic to me about the concept of a country with virtually no natural resources starting a war with a country wildly rich in natural resources for the purpose of trying to force them to give them the resources they desperately need to prosecute a war.

[Punching Bag]

No idea why it is listed in Sports (War Games?)

These 13 U.S. Navy Ships Rose from the Dead After Pearl Harbor

https://www.yahoo.com/news/13-u-navy-ships-rose-200930115.html

 

 

[DC Tom]

I just find it hard to believe that the timeline on their strategic objective was so tight that they couldn't make any adjustment to take advantage of an enormous tactical advantage that was staring them in the face.

 

It pretty much was, actually. The Japanese offensive in the Pacific from December 41 to April 42 should be taught at staff colleges; it is unbelievable how tight the schedule and intricate the maneuvers and interplay of landings and offensives were. (For just one example: Bataan held out for so long in no small part because the Japanese had scheduled the 5th Air Fleet and 48th Division to participate in the attack on the Dutch East Indies at the end of February.) The campaign is a case study in staff work and economy of force. It's also why the Japanese basically got their asses kicked in every campaign afterwards; they spent a year planning their initial Pacific campaign, but they never had that luxury of planning after that.

 

Plus, I think the Japanese carriers (or their accompanying escorts) may have been fuel-critical. They may not have had enough fuel-oil to stick around another day; they certainly didn't have enough to feel comfortable about it. Again, logistics rules all - fuel state was always a concern. Outside of immediate littoral operations (South Pacific, the English Channel, the Mediterranean, where a fleet base was never far away), I can't think of any naval operation by any navy in World War 2 that wasn't dictated to a large degree by fuel availability. Hell, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher won three of the six (or five, if you're a purist) carrier battles ever fought, and was relieved of command basically for being overly worried (if not paranoid) about his fuel state.

 

Plus, it was simply against Japanese fleet doctrine. That's a much more subtle point that even most professional historians miss. Japanese fleet doctrine was fundamentally Mahanian/Nelsonian, leavened with the misinterpreted bushido code they fought by, which basically amounted to the doctrine that the opponent's main battle fleet was the battle objective (Mahan) and was to be destroyed in a single decisive engagement (Nelson). And not only were other objectives secondary (which is Mahanian doctrine), but their bushido code insisted that battle was between warriors - infrastructure wasn't attacked for its own sake, because there was no honor in it. Doctrinal adherence is one of the root causes of Nagumo's fatal indecisiveness at Midway, and Mikawa's incomplete victory at Savo Island. (It's also part of the root cause of Halsey's mistakes at Leyte Gulf, Wright's at Tassafaronga, and Admiral Phillips' defeat off the Kuantan Peninsula. The cold, dead hand of doctrine isn't just a Japanese phenomenon.)

 

 

If they had hung around for another 36 hours or so, they might have been able to do so much damage to the infrastructure at Pearl (as well as Hickam and Wheeler) that the Pacific Fleet may well have never recovered enough to be a decisive factor. In the hindsight of amateurs, it just seems like a golden opportunity cast aside in the name of mindless rigidity.

 

The fleet would have recovered, but the war would have been much longer. Most people don't know, but Pearl Harbor wasn't the main Pacific Fleet base in 1941 (its home port was San Diego), it was still considered just a forward base. The Pacific Fleet wasn't stationed there until May 1940, and only as a "temporary" measure along with the oil embargo to pressure the Japanese into ending the war in China (spoiler alert: it didn't work). But destroying the port infrastructure would have forced the fleet back to San Diego until it could be rebuilt (or until the US Navy developed "mobile base" capabilities where they could stand up a forward base from literally nothing,,,which they didn't have until 1944.)

 

And yes, it is mindless rigidity...sort of. Again, doctrine...which is mindless rigidity in its own way. But that's in large part because it's vital. Doctrine is how large, complex organizations know what all their parts are doing (it's one of the reasons the German Wehrmacht was so effective - shared and well-understood doctrine, so you as a major commanding a battalion know what the battalions next to you is likely to do.) So you don't violate it on a whim. Part of the job of a military commander, though, is to know when it's appropriate to violate it, which is what makes Nagumo such a poorly thought of commander (and Spruance a highly respected, if somewhat controversial, one.)

 

And you accidentally hit on one of THE major contradictions in the historiography of Pearl Harbor in your post: "...the Pacific Fleet may well have never recovered enough to be a decisive factor..." But the standard interpretation is that the Japanese screwed up by sinking the "obsolete" battleships, and not the carriers. So...the Japanese crippled the Pacific Fleet by sinking and disabling a lot of irrelevant material, but leaving the most important elements of the fleet untouched? The Japanese screwed up by sinking the wrong ships, yet the Pacific was effectively powerless and critically overmatched for the next nine months? The battleship becomes "obsolete" because of the attack on Pearl Harbor...yet the Japanese erred by attacking the battleships, which were not obsolete before the Japanese attacked them? If you think about it, that interpretation makes no logical sense. And it's an interpretive error everybody makes (Willmott is one of the best naval historians around, and even he makes that mistake - in fact, it was reading one of his books that made me first realize "Hey, those can't both be true statements.")

 

And in light of all that, a lot of the inexplicable events and "surprises" surrounding Pearl Harbor make more sense. The Pacific Fleet battleline was the primary target, because it was the decisive fleet element in any battle. The carriers were merely adjuncts, and were secondary. Likewise, with the Japanese carriers being a supporting fleet element rather than a main element, it indicates the operation they were committed to was likewise supporting, thus secondary. And being a secondary operation, it by definition wasn't intended to be a decisive operation. And in that context, the decision not to further destroy Pearl or invade Hawaii makes sense: the fleet's disabled, the flank of the main action is secure, the secondary operation has achieved its objective.

 

There's always been something hilariously ironic to me about the concept of a country with virtually no natural resources starting a war with a country wildly rich in natural resources for the purpose of trying to force them to give them the resources they desperately need to prosecute a war.

 

That's pretty much why countries fight wars, though. To steal **** they need but don't have. Fighting over more ambiguous principles is a relatively new idea (even ostensibly religious wars, like the Thirty Years' War, were ultimately fought to steal other people's stuff. Wars are basically two Negans hitting each other with baseball bats until one agrees to give the other half his stuff.) The irony is that it does seem so ironic, because it's historically not ironic at all.

 

Regarding the Japanese economy...one of my favorite illustrations of how woefully unprepared they were is: when the first Zero prototype was readied for its first test flight, it was towed from the factory to the airfield by a team of oxen. A modern airplane, towed to the flight line for its test flight by cattle. How's that for a juxtaposition? Japan was so completely incapable of prosecuting a modern war it's a miracle they managed as much as they did...which also demonstrates how unbelievably good their initial war planning and operations were, to overcome that economic deficiency.