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4th and 1 at the 2, up by 10......


Special K

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So...if the Bills had a 60% chance of ending the game right then and there (by either making the 1st down or scoring a TD), versus a 95% chance of being up 13 points with 2:00 on the clock and Tampa receiving a kickoff, are there really people who logically opt for the latter? Particularly when you realize that the 40% on the other side of option #1 is still a 10 point lead with your opponent at their own 2-yd line and no timeouts?

 

Statistically speaking, I still think it's a pretty easy choice. But to each his own.

Yeah agree. but Jauron coaches to not lose. And we know how that usually turns out.As someone mentioned earlier in the thread-the Hooded One would have gone for the yard.

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MRM33064:

 

I agree with you on the call made by Jauron from our own half, definitely a + expected points call.

 

I also agree that going for it at the end maximized our expected points over kicking the field goal.

 

HOWEVER, there are TWO problems with that simple analysis at this point of the game (and why I feel that kicking was the correct call).

 

First, the idea of the game is to WIN, not to maximize the point differential. This means that the value of each point is not a linear function (and hence, simply looking at the average points will not give us an accurate picture of how often we win). Of the two options, going for it has a greater expected point value than kicking the field goal, but it also has a wider range of possible outcomes, and more highly negative outcomes than kicking the field goal.

 

The second problem is that all those expected point numbers are valid for when their are no future time constraints. All of the expected points numbers assume that someone is going to score before the half/game ends. At this point in the game, that is not a reasonable assumption, so the expected point values are not the same as you are claiming.

 

The end result is that I believe that between the greater chance of a highly negative outcome from going for it outweighs the benefits of going for it with that score and time left on the clock. I also believe that the FG has a higher expected points than you claim as well since the game was close to ending. All in all, when figured in WINS and not PTS, the decision had little impact. We were in a position where our winning % was probably over 99% no matter what play was called.

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Clearly the odds of a "disaster" such as a block being returned for a TD are much lower on a FG attempt compared to running a play from the LOS.

 

By going up 13, you're forcing the opponent to drive the entire length of the field twice. If you're only up by 10, they only have to get to about the 40 to attempt a field goal. So even if they score a TD and recover an onsides kick, they would still have to gain about 60 more yards to get the 2nd TD. If they only needed a FG, they would only need to gain about 20 more yards. Considering the limited amount of time left in the game, that 40 yard difference more than justifies the Bills kicking the FG.

 

I don't know how many 58 yarders Nugent has made in his career, but even if that's true you are much like everyone else, ignoring the 24 yard difference in Tampa's drive start (2 if we fail on 4th down, 26 on average after a kickoff). So really your liberal 40 yard estimate amounts to a 16 yard advantage for us. That absolutely is not worth passing on the upside of putting a game away with a 4th&1, which btw we convert 75% of the time (conservative estimate since that is league average and were running at will).

 

Kicking in that spot is horrible. Anyone who thinks that's nitpicking because we won, then fine. Just don't ever accuse anyone of hindsight when he does something stupid that doesn't work. You can stick on 13 and watch the dealer bust with his face card - doesn't make it the right decision.

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I know its moot because the game was won anyway, but I believe the Bills should have gone for it on that 4th and 1 play at the end of the game.

 

Best case scenario: Touchdown....game over

 

Second best case scenario: First down.....run out the clock.....game over.

 

Worst case scenario: Turnover on downs....Bucs take over inside the 5 down 2 scores, with no timeouts.

 

To me it was a no-brainer to go for it there.......imagine if the Bucs returned the ensuing kickoff after the FG for a TD, or scored real quickly.....the Bills would have been staring down an onside kick in a 1 score game.

 

I know it doesn't matter now, but what do you guys think?

 

Funny you posted this topic. As the Bills were in the midst of the situation and trotting out the FG unit, I thought of the same thing. IMO the logical choice was to go for it. weighing out the positives and negatives if you get stuffed, you are looking at a minimum 18 yard gain (1st and 10 from the 2 minus ball on 20 from a touch back). Those 18 yards equate to valuable seconds taken off the clock.

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I don't know how many 58 yarders Nugent has made in his career, but even if that's true you are much like everyone else, ignoring the 24 yard difference in Tampa's drive start (2 if we fail on 4th down, 26 on average after a kickoff). So really your liberal 40 yard estimate amounts to a 16 yard advantage for us. That absolutely is not worth passing on the upside of putting a game away with a 4th&1, which btw we convert 75% of the time (conservative estimate since that is league average and were running at will).

 

Kicking in that spot is horrible. Anyone who thinks that's nitpicking because we won, then fine. Just don't ever accuse anyone of hindsight when he does something stupid that doesn't work. You can stick on 13 and watch the dealer bust with his face card - doesn't make it the right decision.

 

I'm not saying that I think Jauron doesn't make mistakes on 4th and short (he clearly does all the god damn time), I just don't think this was one of them due to the time on the clock and the score. While we lose ~20 yards of field position by going for 3 vs going for it and not making it, we gain an extra 35 yards of field at the other end when they have to score that 2nd TD.

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So...if the Bills had a 60% chance of ending the game right then and there (by either making the 1st down or scoring a TD), versus a 95% chance of being up 13 points with 2:00 on the clock and Tampa receiving a kickoff, are there really people who logically opt for the latter? Particularly when you realize that the 40% on the other side of option #1 is still a 10 point lead with your opponent at their own 2-yd line and no timeouts?

 

Statistically speaking, I still think it's a pretty easy choice. But to each his own.

 

The problem with this type of statistical analysis is that it doesn't allow for chaos. There are entirely too many dynamics affecting the outcome of the game to be able to generalize the probabilities of certain outcomes coming to pass. Therefore you logic based on that analysis is already flawed before you even crunch your first number. The conservative approach here is the best option for mitigating the worst case scenario, which is why it is the best decision. The odds of missing the FG are substantially lower than the odds of not making the first down, just as the odds of a turnover during a FG attempt are substantially lower than the odds of a turnover during a regular play. Thus, you are more likely to arrive at the same worst case scenario by going for it and failing than you are by attempting the FG, and thus, statistically speaking it can be argued that the best possible coarse is to kick the FG.

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The problem with this type of statistical analysis is that it doesn't allow for chaos. There are entirely too many dynamics affecting the outcome of the game to be able to generalize the probabilities of certain outcomes coming to pass. Therefore you logic based on that analysis is already flawed before you even crunch your first number. The conservative approach here is the best option for mitigating the worst case scenario, which is why it is the best decision. The odds of missing the FG are substantially lower than the odds of not making the first down, just as the odds of a turnover during a FG attempt are substantially lower than the odds of a turnover during a regular play. Thus, you are more likely to arrive at the same worst case scenario by going for it and failing than you are by attempting the FG, and thus, statistically speaking it can be argued that the best possible coarse is to kick the FG.

There are many reasons why your analysis is incorrect, but I've spent enough time in this thread. We'll agree to disagree.

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I don't know how many 58 yarders Nugent has made in his career, but even if that's true you are much like everyone else, ignoring the 24 yard difference in Tampa's drive start (2 if we fail on 4th down, 26 on average after a kickoff). So really your liberal 40 yard estimate amounts to a 16 yard advantage for us. That absolutely is not worth passing on the upside of putting a game away with a 4th&1, which btw we convert 75% of the time (conservative estimate since that is league average and were running at will).

 

Kicking in that spot is horrible. Anyone who thinks that's nitpicking because we won, then fine. Just don't ever accuse anyone of hindsight when he does something stupid that doesn't work. You can stick on 13 and watch the dealer bust with his face card - doesn't make it the right decision.

 

Yes, exactly what BuffOrrange said. :rolleyes: Folks just don't want to acknowledge that a 10 point lead could ever be preferable to a 13 point lead - depending on the field position and time left in the game.

 

TCALI artfully rolled up all of the probability analysis and summed it up in one "big picture" sentence: "Fact is--you rush for 1 yard--game over. You kick the FG--you give them a chance."

 

We will see many, many decisions this season requiring comparable analysis, and I'm really hoping that we can have this kind of thread again. IMO, optimizing football decision-making is a grossly underutilized tool - and something that can significantly increase our chances of winning yet has absolutely nothing to do with blocking, tackling, or talent on the field.

 

I may only have 5-6 supporters on this, but in terms of trade-offs, in a heartbeat I'd trade-off one of our Adjunct Assistant Running Backs Blocking Coaches for one sharp PhD in the box who'd focus solely on these issues.

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Hey all. I dug around and found that interview that 60mins did with Bill Bellichick. I don't think CBS has the entire piece available on the web, but they have a big chunk of it. Jon Fox also gives his comments regarding all the new statistical analysis and database technology these coaches use. You can find it here:

 

Text/Article:

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/16/...ain;contentBody

 

Video Link:

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=644...ated;photovideo

 

Like I said, I think the full interview is not on here because I remember them specifically talking about the 4th & short (just out of FG range) vs. Punting -- where you are statistically better to go for it b/c the odds of a touchback are so high you don't gain much field position by punting.

 

Anyway, this interview was from 2004 (you can tell based on the technology they are using). Imagine the advances since then... Pretty interesting stuff...

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FWIW, I did poll a football-savvy statistician on this and his conclusion was that going for it was indeed the better move, but that the decision itself wasn't particularly consequential on those facts.

 

The gist of his response: At that time in the game, with a 10 point lead, his numbers showed that the Bills had close to a 98% chance of winning. Deciding to go for it would've pushed the chance of winning almost all the way to 100%. Deciding to attempt a FG instead reduced the chance of winning, but only reduced it to about 96%.

 

So, his conclusion was that attempting a FG reduced our chances of winning, but not dramatically.

 

Going for the 4th-and-1 earlier in the game had a bigger positive impact, probability-wise, than the negative impact of the erroneous decision to kick the FG at the end.

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FWIW, I did poll a football-savvy statistician on this and his conclusion was that going for it was indeed the better move, but that the decision itself wasn't particularly consequential on those facts.

 

The gist of his response: At that time in the game, with a 10 point lead, his numbers showed that the Bills had close to a 98% chance of winning. Deciding to go for it would've pushed the chance of winning almost all the way to 100%. Deciding to attempt a FG instead reduced the chance of winning, but only reduced it to about 96%.

 

So, his conclusion was that attempting a FG reduced our chances of winning, but not dramatically.

 

Going for the 4th-and-1 earlier in the game had a bigger positive impact, probability-wise, than the negative impact of the erroneous decision to kick the FG at the end.

 

And this sums up why your so-called analysis is complete bull ****. In no world does kicking a FG and extending your lead from 10 to 13 points with little time remaining decrease your chances of winning.

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FWIW, I did poll a football-savvy statistician on this and his conclusion was that going for it was indeed the better move, but that the decision itself wasn't particularly consequential on those facts.

 

The gist of his response: At that time in the game, with a 10 point lead, his numbers showed that the Bills had close to a 98% chance of winning. Deciding to go for it would've pushed the chance of winning almost all the way to 100%. Deciding to attempt a FG instead reduced the chance of winning, but only reduced it to about 96%.

 

So, his conclusion was that attempting a FG reduced our chances of winning, but not dramatically.

 

Going for the 4th-and-1 earlier in the game had a bigger positive impact, probability-wise, than the negative impact of the erroneous decision to kick the FG at the end.

 

If you just post the bottom line without indicating the analysis and calculations that allowed you to arrive at that conclusion, aren't your really just offering up a meaningless set of numbers with no bearing on reality? Never mind the fact that it is beyond absurd to assign probabilities to a game with an infinite number of dynamics that affect each play. The fallacy of that line of thinking is so obvious that it really disturbs me that people consider this a sound supportive argument to begin with. Nevertheless, even if you choose to buy into this flawed logic, you should at least be willing to show the calculations that allowed you to arrive at that conclusion. Otherwise, you are just some dude spouting off some numbers that have no meaning.

 

A true expert in probabilities and statistics would be able to recognize the fallacy in this kind of argument pretty much immediately. What these people who make these kinds of arguments are doing is betting on the fact that the general populous will be too ignorant and/or lazy to research the numbers in a way that will allow for a meaningful rebuttal. And so they believe they will get people to buy into their flawed and biased arguments simply because it is the easiest thing to do. This type of argument is both deliberate and flagrantly offensive to integrity and intelligence, and as such it carries no weight with me or anyone else with half a brain.

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Never mind the fact that it is beyond absurd to assign probabilities to a game with an infinite number of dynamics that affect each play.

 

Let's just say that's just very wrong. Very.

 

In earlier posts I did post a more detailed, though still summary, analysis. From my own standpoint, I've been studying this kind of thing independently for several years - it's a small hobby - and I'll admit that I do have comprehensive data on literally thousands of NFL and college games. I'm not an "expert", but my hobby has led me to subject my methodology to academics I respect, and I'm reasonably confident in most of it.

 

However, there are better sources - several academic works (cited previously in the thread) have been published on this topic as well. The math tends to get a little hairy, but the conclusions are easy to understand and appreciate. For those who aren't very math-oriented, I also posted some links to a few graphs that demonstrate some interesting results ... though I suppose it is possible for some to look at such things, turn away, and summarily decry LIES! LIES!

 

Actually, part of what makes it interesting to really study these issues is the vitriol it elicits when the numbers show something contrary to what some think is "football sense."

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Let's just say that's just very wrong. Very.

 

In earlier posts I did post a more detailed, though still summary, analysis. From my own standpoint, I've been studying this kind of thing independently for several years - it's a small hobby - and I'll admit that I do have comprehensive data on literally thousands of NFL and college games. I'm not an "expert", but my hobby has led me to subject my methodology to academics I respect, and I'm reasonably confident in most of it. However, there are better sources - several academic works (cited previously in the thread) have been published on this topic as well. The math tends to get a little hairy, but the conclusions are easy to understand and appreciate.

 

So then why are you using expected points numbers that don't account for the end of the game in your original posts? And why aren't you accounting for the non-linear behaviour of points in terms of wins (and relying on average points)? Your analysis would suggest that we were better off going for it if we were down by 2 pts as well, which is ABSURD!

 

These are two fundamental flaws to your math, and you havn't addressed (or attempted to address) them at all. The guy you talked too who is converting things to win% has it right, that is all we are concerned about with that decision, but I don't trust his numbers saying that a team up by 13 with 2 minutes left only wins 96% of the time.

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So then why are you using expected points numbers that don't account for the end of the game in your original posts? And why aren't you accounting for the non-linear behaviour of points in terms of wins (and relying on average points)? Your analysis would suggest that we were better off going for it if we were down by 2 pts as well, which is ABSURD!

These are two fundamental flaws to your math, and you havn't addressed (or attempted to address) them at all. The guy you talked too who is converting things to win% has it right, that is all we are concerned about with that decision, but I don't trust his numbers saying that a team up by 13 with 2 minutes left only wins 96% of the time.

 

The numbers do account for time remaining in the game, and field position. If you're suggesting that expected points alone isn't the only relevant metric - yes, that's correct. If I said EP was the only relevant metric earlier, then I was incorrect. Obviously, you're right, scoring is also non-linear (one cannot cash in 2.8 or 5.8 worth of expected points on the scoreboard). However, in a way, your point helps illustrates the bigger point - the analysis is basically an optimization exercise among factors such as lead (or deficiency), field position, time remaining, and so forth - one that, I believe, is subject to to some reasonable calculation.

 

Disbelief of a data point (i.e. the 96% number) is somewhat unassailable (I suppose it can be believed or not), but that number itself is sort of secondary in this situation. The question is more which decision, at the time its made, yields the highest probable winning percentage - regardless of what those actual %s are.

 

I'd actually encourage other posters to post alternative analysis, particularly if their numbers show something different - not as a challenge, just for discussion.

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The numbers do account for time remaining in the game, and field position. If you're suggesting that expected points alone isn't the only relevant metric - yes, that's correct. If I said EP was the only relevant metric earlier, then I was incorrect. Obviously, you're right, scoring is also non-linear (one cannot cash in 2.8 or 5.8 worth of expected points on the scoreboard). However, in a way, your point helps illustrates the bigger point - the analysis is basically an optimization exercise among factors such as lead (or deficiency), field position, time remaining, and so forth - one that, I believe, is subject to to some reasonable calculation.

 

Disbelief of a data point (i.e. the 96% number) is somewhat unassailable (I suppose it can be believed or not), but that number itself is sort of secondary in this situation. The question is more which decision, at the time its made, yields the highest probable winning percentage - regardless of what those actual %s are.

 

I'd actually encourage other posters to post alternative analysis, particularly if their numbers show something different - not as a challenge, just for discussion.

 

You are trying to make a mountain out of a molehill. Football is a 4 act play that's been running for a hundred years. It is populated by humans, with human decisions good or bad. There is nothing new to be said, or discovered. Untold thousands before you have applied every and all statistical treatments.

 

It is a game played by humans of varying talent, some that occasionally do things that their history says they shouldn't be able do, with varying health, with plays directed by humans of varying predictive skill, in varying weather, on varying surfaces, with varying levels of noise and distraction.

 

Add in an oviod ball with unpredictable, bounces, caroms, etc.

 

You can lose a game with the toss of a coin in OT, or a bonehead call on a game-starting toss by picking possession over the prevailing winds. You can lose a game because a jerk on the sidelines mouths off.

 

It's the general chaos of the sport that makes the game worth watching. Stats tell things, but plain and simple chance often finds its' way.

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You are trying to make a mountain out of a molehill. Football is a 4 act play that's been running for a hundred years. It is populated by humans, with human decisions good or bad. There is nothing new to be said, or discovered. Untold thousands before you have applied every and all statistical treatments.

 

It is a game played by humans of varying talent ,some that occasionally do things that their history says they shouldn't be able do, with varying health, with plays directed by humans of varying predictive skill, in varying weather, on varying surfaces, with varying levels of noise and distraction.

 

Add in an oviod ball with unpredictable, bounces, caroms, etc.

 

You can lose a game with the toss of a coin in OT, or a bonehead call on a game-starting toss by picking possession over the prevailing winds. You can lose a game because a jerk on the sidelines mouths off.

 

It's the general chaos of the sport that makes the game worth watching. Stats tell things, but plain and simple chance often finds its' way.

 

Completely rational, totally correct .... with one small caveat. This is more about a methodology to guide decisions with the understanding that outcomes are indeed variable, as you state.

 

When folks sit down at a blackjack (or poker) table, or when an insurance actuary needs to underwrite risk, something needs to guide their decisions. The blackjack player needs to decide whether to hit that 14 to the dealer's face card. The actuary needs to quantify the value of what can sometimes appear to be a myriad of possible outcomes. Some blackjack players do it by "feel" (the "football sense" crowd), others - like the actuaries - use tools such as studying the results of millions of similar or analogous situations to guide their actions.

 

Either methodology can ultimately win or lose (outcomes vary), but we're trying to give some objectivity to whether one has a better chance of winning or losing, at the time the decision is made.

 

We'll close this out - but maybe we'll get another chance to debate a similar decision soon ... and hopefully it will involve a situation where we already have another >90% chance of winning.

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