SectionC3

I think you’re looking for “corroborating” instead of “circumstantial.” E.g., evidence of physical trauma to the victim would be direct evidence of the rape and corroborate a victim’s testimony as to a rape. The corroborating evidence rule applies to accomplice testimony and confessions. Testimony of a victim, standing alone, is legally sufficient to convict in a sexual abuse/sexual assault case. That said, prosecutors are disinclined to bring a case to a grand jury (other than perhaps a child sexual abuse case) in the absence of corroborating evidence. So, technically, this case could be brought on the testimony of the victim alone. But I don’t think that will be an issue because we have the text message exchanges that corroborate at least the contention that sexual intercourse occurred. How that effects the forcible penetration element of the crime lies in the eye of the beholder, I suppose.

There is enough. Her testimony alone would be legally sufficient to support conviction of a crime/crimes. Whether Brown should be charged, and whether a jury should convict on that testimony, are different questions. But there is enough to convict — it’s called “legally sufficient evidence” — even in the absence of a corroborating witness. **This point, of course, assumes that her version of events is credible and that she can testify credibly as to those events.

I’m not up for flipping the burden of proof. But you’ve hit on an interesting subject. The considerations here aren’t criminal — they’re basically economic for the NFL. Do you think breast cancer awareness week is an accident? I don’t. The league is actively attempting to increase its female fan base. And if there’s a hint of merit to this story, the league will not let it overshadow the 100th anniversary celebration and aggravate its female fans. No inside knowledge there - just a strong opinion. If she appears credible in a league interview then he is in deep trouble with his employer.

The $75,000 point is misleading. She asked for damages in excess of 75k in the complaint. But ultimately I agree with you that, at this point, he looks like a viable candidate for the exempt list. I assume the NFL will speak with the plaintiff shortly, and if she appears credible Brown may have a problem with his employer. I didn’t see it but I’m not surprised. This case is a bit unique for these agents — it’s an active sexual assault complaint and perhaps investigation. It requires a delicate touch that most of them — and perhaps particularly Rosenhaus — aren’t used to having.

No surprise there. Doing his job, trying to take the story back, and trying to protect the guaranteed cash. Rosenhaus might seem like a slippery guy, but he is good at his job.

There’s a lot of self-blame in situations like that. I understand your point, and it’s one that perhaps someday a jury or juries will wrestle with. But I don’t think it’s dispositive of anything.

Based on the dope that he has repping him now, I’m with you. Mr. “countersue the complainant” is going to get run over if this case goes to trial. I’ve only seen a photo of the guy, but strongly suspect that the female jurors will detest him.

Well said. The process has to play out, but there are hints here that this could turn into a headache for Brown. I tend to think the angle here is for plaintiff to force a settlement by the timing of the complaint (falls right after NFL’s opening weekend), but that strategy doesn’t mean that the claims are bogus. Perhaps the client doesn’t want to testify about the most traumatic incident of her life. Perhaps counsel is worried about some of the weaknesses in the case that I noted. But, at bottom, this was a solid hit job by plaintiff’s attorneys — seemingly well-planned, cognizant of media implications w/ polygraph points and text screenshots, and put Brown on his heels right off the bat. There was no need to put the “extra” information re: the poly test and the screen shots in the complaint — in some instances, it’s bad lawyering because it could be a tip of the hand. Here, however, the revelations were designed to influence the media, stress the opponent, and perhaps influence the jury pool. Brown is not dealing with amateurs here.

This point was made in the complaint. The polygraph results are inadmissible. The reference to the polygraph in the complaint was made to affect public opinion. And, frankly, it’s good lawyering to put her to a polygraph. In a high profile case like this, competent counsel should perform his/her own polygraph of the client before commencing a lawsuit. It’s a sign to me that her lawyers know what they’re doing, have worked the case up a bit before commencing the action, and aren’t going to get rolled by the threat of a counterclaim for libel/slander. Brown’s not dealing with a bunch of clowns here, and if I was him I’d like for the best female litigator in this area that I could find.

They talk. Outcries normally are made to a trusted person e.g., loved one, friend, etc.

Let’s see if the lawyer verifies the counterclaim. Then I’ll put a little more stock in whatever that lawyer has said about this case.

To be fair, “going through the routine” doesn’t happen in every instance of rape for a variety of reasons. Frankly I question whether the majority or even a near majority of rapes are followed by such a procedure.

I’m not sure how a sexual assault exam would be irrelevant here. Sure, the scientific evidence collected through a rape kit (e.g., ***** sample, hair, fingernail scrapings) would be of relatively little value because there is no dispute as to the identity of the perpetrator. (Fingernail scrapings might support a victim’s contention that she fought off her attacker, but that’s besides the point as of now). Where I STRONGLY disagree with you is with respect to physical examination that is conducted in conjunction with the performance of the rape kit. The examination easily could have produced evidence of the use of force against the victim, including forcible penetration. Ultimately, this is a case that will come down to the evaluation of the plaintiff’s credibility. From both civil and criminal perspectives (I appreciate that there is no criminal proceeding [yet]), the victim’s testimony that she was raped is sufficient to meet the burden of proof. I suspect that the case will be settled out of court — there appear to be weaknesses in her case (no rape kit, probably no admissible prompt outcry evidence inasmuch as I understand the first disclosure of the alleged rape to a friend to have been very distant in time from that event, possible subsequent friendly contact with defendant), but if this is a contest of credibility and I’m Antonio Brown I’m not sure that I want any part of it for a variety of reasons. (Along those lines, the counterclaim for slander or whatever his attorney intends to allege is not a great idea because it threatens the possibility of aggravating impressionable jurors.) So, thumbnail sketch, it’s not a slam dunk but this is at least a headache and perhaps even a very big problem for Brown.

You disagreed with me point. That makes a debate, no?

The contract likely would (at best, from the league's perspective), incorporate the terms of the CBA. Which brings us back to this point - we still have a problem with the ambiguity of the tag language.

Why is that? In simple terms, Sentence #1 speaks only to the tagging club. Sentence #2, as noted in an earlier post, should have been much better written if the intent was to prevent a tagged player from signing a long-term contract with a club other than the tagging club after July 15. To the extent Sentence #1 reflects that the entirety of the clause is to pertain only to the relationship between the tagging club and the player (not too much of a stretch, given the availability of cleaner, plainer language as noted earlier in the thread), then we have found a loophole. Along those lines, Sentence #1 easily could (and probably should) speak to the player, not to the club, e.g., "Any player designated a Franchise Player shall have until . . . July 15 of the League Year . . for which the designation takes effect to sign with any Club, including the Club designating him a Franchise Player, a multiyear contract or extension." Boom. Problem solved. No room for this debate, and no occasion for a sharp agent/attorney to try to get a client like Clowney leverage and big bucks a year earlier than most would expect.

So do I. And, as noted, the phraseology is poor. Here's the sentence in question: "After that date, the player may sign only a one-year Player Contract with his Prior Club for that season, and such Player Contract may not be extended until after the Club’s last regular season game of that League Year." Your interpretation would be rock solid if the language was "the only contract a player may sign until the completion of the Prior Club's last regular season game of that League Year is a one-year Player Contract with his Prior Club for that season." (And, in point of candor, my point would be rock solid if the language read, "After that date, the player may sign with his Prior Club only a one-year Player Contract for that season). In any event, your interpretation would still be pretty close to rock solid if the sentence referenced above is read in isolation. The problem remains that the first sentence of the paragraph (not quoted here) suggests that the limitation on contract applies only to the franchising club. As noted in a prior post, the last clause of the sentence I quoted above creates a problem from the player's perspective - it suggests that a one-year agreement signed by a franchised player can't be extended until after the Prior Club's final regular season game. But that clause must be read in conjunction with the first sentence of the paragraph, which, again, suggests that the prohibition against extension applies only to the relationship between the franchising club and the franchised player. Taking a broader view of this issue, it's common sense that the league is going to interpret this clause the way that you and the Rochester guy (whatever his name is) do. Allowing the player to sign a multi-year agreement with 31 teams, but only a one-year agreement with the franchising team, incentivizes stalling on the part of the player to force a trade to a team eligible to reach a long-term agreement with him. That can't be what owners want. But it would be much better from the player's perspective if he was eligible to sign a long-term agreement with any of the 31 other teams in the league after July 15. In Clowney's case, it might be an $80 million issue. To borrow from Chuck Dickerson, you bet your bippy that I would be all over this if I was his counsel.

Your references are journalist-based. You don't seem to get it. Your beliefs that lawyers contributed to those articles is an assumption. Since you seem to enjoy playing lawyer, instead of citing one article after another by somebody who graduated from Mizzou or Newhouse or wherever, try reading the CBA and prove that I'm wrong. Or find some arb decisions that say I'm wrong. Put your money where your mouth is. I'll be here all day. EDIT: And, for what it's worth, you still can't refute the point that the clause is very, very poorly written and leaves open the possibility that it could be construed my way by an independent arbitrator.

You aren't ruining my day. I do this for a living. It's a bad provision, and it only takes one smart lawyer to exploit it. All you're doing is regurgitating articles by people who are parroting the same misconception. Repetition doesn't add validity to a point. EDIT - the point you emphasize in your quote seems to be a journalist's explanation of the CBA. No CBA language is cited in that passage; by contrast, I quoted it earlier nd explained precisely how the clause could and should be attacked in favor of the player. Along those lines, nothing you've referenced addresses my point (one that you have been unable to rebut, for what it's worth) - the language is ambiguous and it has the potential to cause a problem for the league if a smart agent tries to exploit it. Things like this have happened before even in the NFL context - I believe Brees had a tag grievance that nobody saw coming that he won. On the flip side, the moron who represents Bell didn't realize that Bell could have been subject to a franchise/transition tag for the 2019 season until deep into Bell's holdout. In point of fact, issues like the one I've presented arise all of the time in the "real world." You would be surprised how much your homeowners' and auto policies are litigated, even though the "guts" of those contracts have been around for years, if not for decades.

One more time - what is "actual reported info" - a journalist's interpretation of a contractual provision?

Could AB wear the old helmet model? Yup. Rosenhaus did better than the agents for Brady and Rodgers on that point. And the fact that an issue hasn't been pursued doesn't mean that it lacks merit - it could also mean that nobody has been creative/intelligent enough to identify and attack the point.

Sorry, but you're wrong. The clause "with his Prior Club" suggests that the one-year provision applies only to the franchising club. If the provision was meant to apply to any contract the player might sign with any club, then the better phrasing would have been "The player may sign only a one-year Player Contract for that season." Whether the wanna be lawyers here want to admit it or not, this part of the CBA is poorly drafted and there is wiggle room here.

For what it's worth, the league would have a better argument if the clause read something like "Any player who is designated a Franchise Player shall have until 12:00 p.m. on July 15 to sign a multiyear contract . . . ." The fact that it doesn't read that way supports the idea that the clause is meant to apply to the franchising team, not to the player.

Sure those outlets have lawyers. But did they contribute to the story? And, for what it's worth, you still haven't contradicted my point about the ambiguity of the clause. Finally - maybe, just maybe, it would behoove players to get sharp lawyers for agents as opposed to the knuckleheads a lot of them tend to hire. Drew Rosenhaus might seem like a putz, but look at what he did for Antonio Brown on the helmet issue. He thought of things that nobody else bothered to explore under the CBA, and he kept the issue alive for his client for a lot longer than most would have expected.

Probably written by a sports journalist, not a lawyer. To be taken with a grain of salt. Read the first sentence in this clause. I'm not saying it's dispositive, just "gray" - it looks to me like the prohibition against post-July 15 extensions could apply only to the franchising team. What makes it "gray" is the last clause of the paragraph. The question is whether the first clause (or anything else in the CBA, which I haven't bothered to and won't read) changes the interpretation of this language. With respect to your underlined language, Clowney isn't under contract and therefore is free to negotiate as he sees fit. Not sure how the penalty language would apply to a team to which he is traded if the conversations occur prior to the signing of the franchise tender. *** Any Club designating a Franchise Player shall have until 4:00 p.m., New York time, on July 15 of the League Year (or, if July 15 falls on a Saturday or Sunday, the first Monday thereafter) for which the designation takes effect to sign the player to a multiyear contract or extension. After that date, the player may sign only a one-year Player Contract with his Prior Club for that season, and such Player Contract may not be extended until after the Club’s last regular season game of that League Year.