MRM33064

I don't think it's entirely fair to call Ralph "typically cheap" when it comes to player signings. I always got the sense Ralph was willing to open his wallet for players, just not so much for front office personnel and coaching. My sense is that we have more example of players that, in retrospect, we overpaid as "great players" (who weren't, or aren't) than "great players" we either lost or didn't sigh because we weren't willing to pay for them ... but I'm happy to be shown otherwise ... just a sense.

Thanks for posting this clip. Funny though, I came away with a different conclusion - i.e. I think Ellison was actually in better position there than I originally thought he was. That pass (and catch) was just really, really good. Those damn Patriots. EDIT: I changed my mind - it was mostly the catch. If the Watson route was headed to the post, Ellison was actually in better position had the pass gone to where the route looked like it was intended. The pass was somewhat behind, or the right, of Watson - unless Brady put it there on purpose.

The numbers do account for time remaining in the game, and field position. If you're suggesting that expected points alone isn't the only relevant metric - yes, that's correct. If I said EP was the only relevant metric earlier, then I was incorrect. Obviously, you're right, scoring is also non-linear (one cannot cash in 2.8 or 5.8 worth of expected points on the scoreboard). However, in a way, your point helps illustrates the bigger point - the analysis is basically an optimization exercise among factors such as lead (or deficiency), field position, time remaining, and so forth - one that, I believe, is subject to to some reasonable calculation. Disbelief of a data point (i.e. the 96% number) is somewhat unassailable (I suppose it can be believed or not), but that number itself is sort of secondary in this situation. The question is more which decision, at the time its made, yields the highest probable winning percentage - regardless of what those actual %s are. I'd actually encourage other posters to post alternative analysis, particularly if their numbers show something different - not as a challenge, just for discussion.

Let's just say that's just very wrong. Very. In earlier posts I did post a more detailed, though still summary, analysis. From my own standpoint, I've been studying this kind of thing independently for several years - it's a small hobby - and I'll admit that I do have comprehensive data on literally thousands of NFL and college games. I'm not an "expert", but my hobby has led me to subject my methodology to academics I respect, and I'm reasonably confident in most of it. However, there are better sources - several academic works (cited previously in the thread) have been published on this topic as well. The math tends to get a little hairy, but the conclusions are easy to understand and appreciate. For those who aren't very math-oriented, I also posted some links to a few graphs that demonstrate some interesting results ... though I suppose it is possible for some to look at such things, turn away, and summarily decry LIES! LIES! Actually, part of what makes it interesting to really study these issues is the vitriol it elicits when the numbers show something contrary to what some think is "football sense."

FWIW, I did poll a football-savvy statistician on this and his conclusion was that going for it was indeed the better move, but that the decision itself wasn't particularly consequential on those facts. The gist of his response: At that time in the game, with a 10 point lead, his numbers showed that the Bills had close to a 98% chance of winning. Deciding to go for it would've pushed the chance of winning almost all the way to 100%. Deciding to attempt a FG instead reduced the chance of winning, but only reduced it to about 96%. So, his conclusion was that attempting a FG reduced our chances of winning, but not dramatically. Going for the 4th-and-1 earlier in the game had a bigger positive impact, probability-wise, than the negative impact of the erroneous decision to kick the FG at the end.

I'm not sure that Jauron's character has ever been called into question, even by his biggest detractors. In fact, I think most usually go out of the way to include some kind of "he's a nice person" disclaimer whenever they criticize him, almost as though they want to be 100% certain that the harsh professional criticism doesn't reflect on his personal character. As to his coaching acumen, the only visible metrics we have (as fans) is how successful he is at game management and his overall W/L, and neither are very good. Maybe he's great at something we don't see often - film study, office-related matters, TETRIS - but I'm not sure there would be a mad competition to sign him if we let him go. He'd probably land somewhere as some type of coordinator or position coach, for the primary reason that there is a massive amount of coaching inertia in the NFL. Unless you pull a Turk on the way out - once you're in, you're pretty much in. But sure - I think he seems like he'd be a great neighbor, or a nice guy to invite along to complete your foursome on the first tee.

This is a little off-topic, but the criticism for the Great Gazoo is a little overdone. I used to get a little more frustrated with the (now cliche) Walt Corey "bend-don't-break" approach more than Kelso, per se. When he'd give more cushion than City Mattress, I'd bank on the fact he was doing what he was told. Kelso was a good Bill. All that said, I think Whitner at FS would compete, especially considering he's probably got 30 pounds on Kelso (even counting the space helmet) and from a fan view it feels like he's got equal, if not superior, reaction speed. Owens makes it. Stroud. Lindell might have a shot. That's about it for me.

Nuklz2594 = Ken Linseman? J/K

Yes, exactly what BuffOrrange said. Folks just don't want to acknowledge that a 10 point lead could ever be preferable to a 13 point lead - depending on the field position and time left in the game. TCALI artfully rolled up all of the probability analysis and summed it up in one "big picture" sentence: "Fact is--you rush for 1 yard--game over. You kick the FG--you give them a chance." We will see many, many decisions this season requiring comparable analysis, and I'm really hoping that we can have this kind of thread again. IMO, optimizing football decision-making is a grossly underutilized tool - and something that can significantly increase our chances of winning yet has absolutely nothing to do with blocking, tackling, or talent on the field. I may only have 5-6 supporters on this, but in terms of trade-offs, in a heartbeat I'd trade-off one of our Adjunct Assistant Running Backs Blocking Coaches for one sharp PhD in the box who'd focus solely on these issues.

We have different ideas on the error evaulation, but this is the best objection yet, and certainly reasonable. Decisions can't be made in a vacuum, absolutely correct, and the ideal gameday staff would include someone who had a solid grasp of the probabilities AND the desirable intangible qualities. Someone in the box to radio-down the hard data, the numbers, and someone on the field to use that information to make the call. I'm just not certain that we see a lot of evidence that the data is being used in a lot of gameday decisions. It's the posts like ... "it puts us up by 2 TDS! not just a TD and a FG" that, respectfully, just miss the point. I really hope that wasn't the depth of the sideline analysis, or that Dick really said "3 points is 3 points" or whatnot. I can just imagine Belichick & Co. watching that, giggling.

I think the basic disagreement is that - except in the most obvious examples - many folks just don't want to buy into the idea that there are objective methods to help analyze trade offs in football decisions. Trade offs between points needed, field position, and time ... trade offs between punting, kicking FGs and going for it, and so forth. Each has a proper weight in the equation, but I respectfully think there is a tendency for folks to overvalue the TD in that equation. For instance, if we offered an extreme choice: 1st down at the opponent's 2, with 10mins left in the game, down by 7; or 1st down at your own 2, with 30 seconds to go, down by only 3 - most will agree to be down by 7 rather than 3. In other words, they'd value the field position and time over the extra point differential. One isn't always worse off being down by 5 than down by 2 (the Rams), or being down by 13 than down by 10 (the Bucs). It all depends on the other factors ... and there are literally thousands of real-life examples of those "other factors" to examine which can help to make informed decisions on the closer cases. Running the actual data for the Zorn decision, I believe the decision to go for it was correct (using historical data) if Zorn had assumed that the Rams would've reached about the 25 yard line (or further) on an ensuing post-FG kickoff. In other words, the data shows that the historical chance of winning is generally about the same for the Rams if they have the ball: (a) at the 2 yard line, down by 2; or (b) at the 25 yard line, down by 5. In the Bills situation - similar but not exact - TB would've had a better chance of winning the game, generally, being down 13 points rather than 10 if they had returned the subsequent kickoff to roughly the 25 yard line or further. Obviously, situational factors are certainly relevant. If half the team is injured, it isn't fair to assume the team will perform at least to an average level, and that is implied by looking at data from several thousand games. However, I do think it's very relevant to understand that there is meaningful data to use to guide these decisions objectively - better than relying solely on "football sense" or "feel" or whatnot. When Jauron made the absolute right call (according to the data) on the 4-and-1 at the 36 earlier in the game, he could be lauded as "confident" or "aggressive" or whatever, but the simple truth - regardless of the actual outcome - was that was the right call on the numbers. Marv used to say something like "if you didn't make it, you shouldn't have gone for it", which was obviously his way of criticizing the way folks play on results as opposed to the decision. Similarly, Belichick gets credit for his "guts" or his "desire to win" and such nonsense, but in the majority of cases he is just making the right call based on the probabilities, which I suspect he knows well.

FWIW, how about Zorn's decision yesterday ... late in the game, in a similar field position but with only a 2 point lead, he went for the 4th down even though by doing so and failing, St. Louis had a chance to WIN the game with just a FG. The alternative was to attempt a FG, go up by 5 if it was good, and kick off. Similar, but not identical, analysis applies. (The full analysis is here: http://www.advancednflstats.com/2009/09/ji...4th-down.html.) It's worth a read if trying to break down and analyze these decisions is interesting to you.

LOL. I can take it. Actually, if you really would like to learn a little something about the correct decision making process in these situations, there are some good websites and papers to read ... and you CAN read them on "the Internets"! A few: www.footballcommentary.com, www.advancednflstats.com, Carroll, Palmer, and Thorn's "Hidden Game of Football (1988, 1998)", Professor David Romer's Do Firms Maximize? (2005). The Romer work (http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~dromer/papers/PAPER_NFL_JULY05_FORWEB_CORRECTED.pdf) is a fairly sophisticated read, but the conclusions are straight-forward, and the analysis is similar to what is required to get this answer correct. It's objective, data-driven analysis. It's not just about subjective concepts of being "aggressive" or having "gut feelings" or "a football sense". Anyway, flame on.

In terms of raw expected value (EV), at the time the decision was made, kicking the FG was in the 2.8 range. The EV of going for it was likely almost twice that, if not more. Close to 5.5-6.0. It was really worth more than that though, because in an overall game sense, going for it and succeeding meant the game was over. Keep in mind that getting the first down (just one of 2 possible good results from going for it), was by far the most likely outcome. NFL teams succeeed on 4th-and-1 attempts close to 70% of the time. Hoodie knows these things. On the other hand, the only upside of a (successful) FG is forcing their hand to beat us or lose (we don't even give them the option of, say, scoring a TD, getting deep into our territory again and settling for the tie/overtime). Of course, the extra field position they need to get for a (winning) TD just happens to be, say, about the same field position we could expect to concede to them in a post FG kickoff.

Thanks to everyone for participating in this thread - I think it's a good one, and I think it's highly relevant because similar situations, requiring similar analysis, will most certainly happen again during the season. I do have a few inquiries out to some probability/statistics/actuarial experts, and if I get responses from them I'll post them for everyone's review/comment, FWIW. I don't have any "football strategy expert" contacts, though I tend to believe this is a question with an actual right answer (one way or the other), and not one that requires reference to a feeling, a sense, etc. In other words, "right answer" in the sense that it's almost always the "right answer" to hit that 16 to a dealer's face card on the blackjack table.

I really think a full reading of the data on this is in order. Without intending any disrespect at all, I'm not sure we need to resort to "football sense" for a decision like this any more than one would use "blackjack sense" at a blackjack table in deciding whether to hit 16 to a dealer's face card. There are objective answers in the data. (A recent example is at: http://www.advancednflstats.com/search/lab...x-results=100.) The benefit of possibly going up by 13 instead of 10 (and then kicking off to them) yields the benefit of forcing their 2 scores to be TDs instead of one TD and one FG. If they do score those 2 TDs though, we lose - i.e. we indirectly force them to go for the win, and in the course of scoring the FG we concede them field position on a kickoff. The alternative is to: (a) score, going up by 3 scores, effectively ending the game; (b) get a first down, effectively ending the game; or © fail to get one yard, turning the ball over to them at their own 2, down by 2 scores with 2 mins to go. (Fumbles/disasters could happen during either a FG attempt or going for it.). Probability-wise, at the time the decision is made, any of those outcomes give us a bigger EV of winning the game than attempting a FG. If there is some kind of objective analysis (i.e. one that doesn't rely solely on feel, momentum, etc.) that shows differently, I really do think it would be interesting to see it. Notice I've mercifully refrained from invoking the WWHD standard. (What would Hoodie do?)

Wings - I edited my prior post in this thread to insert a link to a graph, which summarizes the results of a comprehensive statistical analysis on this. Take a look and see if it changes your opinion. BTW, the analysis doesn't even figure in the time of the game, etc., and the other situational factors - including the dramatic incremental benefit of going up by 3 scores versus going from up by 10 to up by 13 (i.e. going up by a margin that would lose the game to 2 TDs).

I think we need a mathematics expert here, but my sense is that the correct decision is to go for it and that it's not even close - even without regard to several of the actual circumstances around the decision. Given the offensive field position, the expected value (EV) of kicking the FG was somewhere close to 3. However, going for it there has an EV of close to 6/7 - it's the EV of gaining 1 yard (yielding 4 more downs, each of which would then in turn have a high EV given the field position) + the EV of scoring a TD on the 4th down play itself, also high. Factoring in the time in the game, the defensive field position in the case of failure, the deficiency of TB timeouts, and the existing 10 point (2 score) lead, I'm not sure attempting a FG is even remotely justifiable. A successful FG still leaves the score differential at 2, and likely concedes 20+ yards of field position on the subsequent kickoff. I'd like someone better at this than I am to give a definitive answer, because even though we did win the game, this is the precise kind of decision that a head coach needs to get right every time. EDIT: There is a very good discussion on this at www.advancednflstats.com, under the "4th Down Study" tab. Link to graph, "Point Values of 4th Down Decisions", below.

Agreed. Attempting the FG there - already up by 2 scores, with 2 mins to go, TB doesn't have all their time-outs and you're inside their 5 yard line - is the wrong move. I don't even think it's close, mathematically. Hopefully it won't matter.

Hoodie does. Little downside risk of not making it, given the time on the clock, timeouts left, and field position.

Quality. Playstation numbers for Freddie today. One mental popcorn f*rt, but on balance two very, very solid weeks for Fast Freddie.

That was a heck of a play design ... Alex, write that one down ....

Sven, you didn't. You DIDN'T. LOL

Siragusa, genius that he is, gripes about kicking a FG midway in the 4th quarter to go up by 2 scores. Good grief.

TO has 2 catches and the one horrid drop ... has he been thrown to only 3 times this game or did I miss a few?