Orton's Arm

I'd argue that the manufacturing base was driven away by several factors: A cost of capital that is far too high China's manipulation of exchange rates (also a dollar that is too strong) Labor unions Problematic corporate management Unfavorable tax and regulatory environments Cost of Capital A corporation's cost of capital is driven by two factors: 1) the interest rate it must pay on its corporate debt, and 2) the rate of return demanded by the owners of its stock. If a company has a 70/30 debt-to-equity ratio, for example, its cost of capital is (0.7 * corporate interest rate) + (0.3 * rate of return on its stock). Several factors affect corporations' cost of capital: 1) The federal deficit. There is only so much investment capital available. When the government runs at a deficit, it must sell government bonds to cover the difference. Investors who might otherwise have purchased corporate debt instead buy up government bonds. The government's actions drive up demand for investment capital; which in turn lowers the amount available for corporations, while increasing the price. This is especially important for manufacturing firms, because they typically must make large investments in expensive machinery to stay competitive. 2) Federal tax policy. The Japanese economic boom of the '80s was fueled largely by tax-free savings accounts. The U.S. government lacks analogous incentives for people to save, except for paperwork-intensive, highly restrictive and regulated accounts such as IRAs and retirement plans. The IRS's desire to eat the seed corn--that is, the investment capital--is one of several factors responsible for the very low net savings rate. 3) "You are what you consume" cultural messages. A large portion of the population has been encouraged to live beyond its means, and to engage in conspicuous consumption. The fact that so much of the population has not engaged in net savings has deprived American manufacturers of the capital needed to buy expensive machinery. The strong dollar Over the last several decades, the goal of American policymakers was to keep the dollar strong. A strong dollar rewards foreign companies who seek to import into the U.S., while punishing American firms who seek to export their goods to other nations. A strong dollar also makes Americans "feel" wealthier, and allows them to buy more imported goods. (Which is one of the reasons why it was pursued.) If the American dollar was far too strong for too long, China's currency was exactly the opposite. China's policymakers deliberately kept their currency weak in order to aid Chinese manufacturers. The head of an American furniture manufacturer noted that this currency manipulation was the single strongest factor in China's edge over American furniture manufacturing; and was twice as important as the difference in labor costs. Labor Unions It is very difficult for a unionized firm to compete with a non-union analog. Toyota, for example, does much of its manufacturing in the U.S., and its factories are non-union. In competing against Toyota and other such firms, the Detroit automakers found their hourly wage rates increased beyond what they could reasonably afford. Even more importantly, the unions imposed lavish pension plans on the automakers. The unions also made it difficult to fire under-performing workers, or to promote anyone except on the basis of seniority. They also imposed unreasonable restrictions, such as forbidding anyone except an electrician from changing a light bulb. Labor unions are also often associated with measures that drive down productivity, such as (in some cases) restrictions on the amount each worker could produce each day. As bad as private sector unions are, public sector unions are far worse. They are strongly associated with increasing the size and burden of government; thereby driving up the aforementioned government deficits. Problematic Corporate Management The management at the Detroit automakers and places like Bethlehem Steel was (typically) very bad. In a perfect world, these badly-managed companies would have gradually been replaced by other American auto and steel manufacturers. To a degree that has happened with steel. But in the automotive sector, the vacuum created by the failure of American auto firms has been filled by foreign substitutes, not by other American firms. Partly this is due to the aforementioned high cost of capital and other factors which make the manufacturing environment unfavorable in the U.S. But it is also due to the sheer difficulty of creating an automotive manufacturing firm from scratch. Unfavorable tax and regulatory environments In a perfect world, the American federal, state, and local governments would be sensitive about adding to the paperwork burdens of individuals and businesses. In the world in which we live, however, it is routine for government bureaucracies to create lengthy, complex, burdensome regulations that are onerous to comply with. When the unreasonable/paperwork burden is added to the reasonable burden of imposing favorable environmental and workplace safety standards, the costs of regulatory compliance become very high. It is also worth noting that the United States has signed trade agreements which specifically forbid it from imposing tariffs on imports based on working conditions in the countries of manufacture. Industrial production in China, for example, can be associated with a massive amount of pollution, but we can't impose a tariff on that portion of the production we import into the U.S. It is also worth noting that the federal tax code strongly penalizes long-term capital investments. Instead of being able to deduct business expenses as they are incurred, American manufacturers must "depreciate" their expenses over the course of many years. This flaw in the tax code creates a completely artificial incentive to invest in items expected to "depreciate" quickly, while avoiding those which depreciate slowly. One reason for the existence of office cubicles, for example, is that cubicles are considered office furniture (depreciates over seven years) as opposed to improvements in the building (depreciates over 40 years). The tax code also hurts the tree farming industry. Each year, tree farmers are expected to pay taxes on the "value increase" of their trees, years before any lumber is harvested or any cash from tree farming is received. While the portion of tax law which relates to tree farming may not seem directly relevant to American manufacturing, it directly illustrates the IRS's short-sightedness, greed, and consequent eagerness to eat the seed corn. Every bolded item in the above list represents a burden that has been added to American manufacturers. (Though in fairness, some burdens--such as bad management--are self-imposed.) The sum total of these burdens became too great for them to bear; which is why they have either gone under (American electronics manufacturers) are going under (American car makers), or have moved overseas. Getting businesses to grow in your country is a lot like getting plants to grow in your garden. In both cases, success results from making conditions as favorable as possible for growth. But in the U.S. we have all too often followed the opposite approach: we have made things progressively worse for businesses in general and manufacturers in particular; and then have wondered why they have gone belly up.

I'm comfortable with the idea of a QB lacking first-rate arm strength, as long as his arm is still good enough. What I really want to see is a college QB who looks like a polished passer--a guy who's NFL-ready as opposed to needing time to develop. Ponder's completion percentage is significantly better than that of Locker or most other college QBs likely to be drafted in 2011. It stands to reason that if Ponder has proven to be a more accurate, better pocket passer at the college level, he might well become the better pocket passer as a pro.

I admit that as a fan, one of my biggest fears is that there will be a franchise QB there when the Bills pick, and that they'll use the pick to grab some other position instead. The QB position has been a source of pain for the Bills ever since Kelly hung up his cleats. A guy like Ponder can end that pain for a long time to come; and can turn that position into a source of considerable strength. For that reason, I am vehemently opposed to passing up a franchise QB. I have similar feelings about the LT position, albeit to a lesser degree. In a perfect world, the Bills would enter the 2011 draft with a top-10 pick. They'd use that pick on Ponder. Then they'd trade their 2nd and 3rd round picks away to get back into the first round, where they'd take a LT. Some people might complain about the lack of bodies--about the fact that you only addressed two holes when you could potentially have filled three. But this is a case of quality over quantity. The holes that would be addressed would be at premium positions and (presumably) filled with first-rate players who will turn their respective positions into sources of long-term strength.

I'd like to add some more thoughts on the 3-4--specifically about the size of the players employed. To get to a 3-4, you'd: 1) Convert a 4-3 DT into an ILB. Minus 40 pounds. 2) Convert a 4-3 DT into a 3-4 NT. Plus 30 pounds. 3) Convert three 4-3 LBs into 3-4 LBs. Plus 30 pounds per LB = 90 pounds total. 4) Convert 4-3 DEs into 3-4 DEs. Plus 35 pounds per DE = 70 pounds total. Total change in weight: plus 150 pounds (give or take). While 20 - 30 of those added pounds represent an ugly gut dangling from your NT, the vast majority of that weight gain represents muscle mass. A bigger, heavier defense like this seems less prone to being worn down by the run; or worn down in general for that matter.

I like the 3-4 for several reasons. One of those reasons is its unpredictability: normally in a 3-4 you'd rush your three down linemen, plus one linebacker. But the LB you use will vary from play to play. So you're creating unpredictability for the offense without taking the risks associated with blitzing. But that said, Thurman brings up good points about the pain likely associated with this switch, due to guys playing out of position, guys like Schobel and his double digit sacks retiring, and to the fact that it often takes rookie defensive linemen a while to become good NFL players. But that said, short-term struggles on the defense could help pave the way to a critical draft pick in the top-10, or (ideally) the top-5!! Then as this year's rookies improve, as new talent is added, and as the first round pick from 2011 comes into his own, this team could show some serious improvement. One last thing: the quoted posts in this thread are well worth reading, IMO. The well-researched data made me optimistic about the Bills' own transition to the 3-4.

Given the direction this team has gone over the last ten years--ever since Kelly retired in fact--you have every right to feel disappointed and frustrated with the performance of the front office. Your expectations would have to be pretty low for you not to feel frustrated. At present, the team is depleted of talent due to years of poor and short-sighted choices by the front office. There's just too much of a talent shortage to fill all the holes in one off-season. Going into the 2010 off-season, the Bills had holes at some of the hardest-to-fill positions: QB, LT, RT, C, NT, RDE, #1 WR, and others. Other than at center, you're very unlikely to be able to fill any of those holes successfully with a third round pick or lower. Circumstances dictated a multi-year rebuilding plan both because of the number of holes, and the fact that so many of those holes were at the positions most highly valued in the draft. My hope as a fan is that the 2010 draft represented a first in a series of steps which will ultimately result in a complete team with good players at the most important positions. (Among which are QB and LT.) If the Bills don't win very many games this season, they'll have a good shot at drafting a QB like Ponder in the 2011 draft. It wouldn't surprise me if Ponder went on to have a better career than any of the QBs drafted in 2010. But that said, I don't want to get my hopes up for Ponder until or unless he actually dons a Bills uniform.

As much as I hate to say it, I think you might be right. When you look at the guy throwing the ball, both his feet are behind the line. But his shoulder juts forward a bit from where his feet were, and the way he threw the ball extended it forward even a little further than that. If you look at 1:22 of the video, you can see the guy's arm extending outward from his body, with his right (throwing) foot almost on the line. I'd estimate the ball was a good foot or foot and a half in front of the line when it was thrown. It seemed like it was about six inches in front of the line when it was caught. The bottom line is that the Bills should either have been more disciplined with kick coverage, or else should have kicked the ball out of bounds, and let their top tier defense win the game for them! :angry:

If Meredith wins the battle at LT, and Brohm is made the starting QB, then our starting QB/LT players would recognize each other from last year's Packers practice squad.

The above link is to a book which claims to demonstrate that the LT position is overrated. However, while the book's author (Joyner) represents his book as being statistics-driven, those who reviewed the book are far from convinced this was the case. Rather, they portray the book as representing Joyner's opinions, with a few statistics thrown around in a rather cursory fashion. Below is a quote from one review of the book: Based on reviews such as the above, I've concluded that the analysis in the book is far more indicative of Joyner's own personal opinions, than it is a case of anything that's been conclusively demonstrated with statistics. On a gut level, I don't think the importance of the LT position is overrated at all. I'm willing to modify that opinion in light of additional evidence; but reviews such as the above make me extremely doubtful that such evidence has been presented in Joyner's book.

I mostly agree with your post. However, the concern about Williams was whether he was fast and athletic enough to be a good LT. Of course, most experts felt that even if you didn't get a good LT with Williams, you'd at least be getting a very good RT. However, a very good RT is typically not considered worthy of the 4th overall pick; so even the experts acknowledged that there was significant risk of Williams not living up to his draft position. I agree, however, that the Williams pick involved some combination of bad luck, and inability to assess how motivated a player would be at the professional level. Bad coaching also played a role, in the sense that the Bills' coaches gave him special treatment/let him slack off. With a more ruthless coach willing to crack the whip (and unwilling to tolerate mediocrity), perhaps Williams would have accomplished more.

In reference to the fumble you mentioned: Jevon Kearse lined up at defensive end, and rushed untouched to the quarterback. The (injured) offensive tackle didn't slow him down at all. (If memory serves, Kearse arrived at Johnson's blindside.) A play like that is a symptom of a problem at OT, not a problem at QB. After we got the injured starting tackles out of the game, and replaced them with their uninjured backups, the situation on the OL became less bad than it had been. I don't remember any DLs rushing untouched to the passer after the backups had been inserted.

My contribution to this thread will be a little less interesting than some of the posts I've read, but here goes: It was the 2001 season, and the Bills were in rebuilding mode. They'd lost a ton of games up to that point. Then they played the Carolina Panthers . . . I strongly felt the Bills needed draft position a lot more than a meaningless win against another lousy team. People felt excited by the win, as though it was something upon which to build. Why do people feel this way, I wondered, when many or most of the starting players responsible for this win will be (or at least should be) replaced by the time the rebuilding project is finished? We should be focused not on the accomplishments of the guys who are just placeholders, but rather on getting the right players in place as quickly as possible. As a result of that win, the Panthers had the second overall pick in the 2002 draft; and the Bills had the fourth overall pick. The Panthers used their pick on Julius Peppers. At fourth overall, the Bills chose . . . One could argue that nearly a year's worth of rebuilding was destroyed by that one win.

As for the injuries on the Bills' OL: the tackles went into that game hurt. The Bills were actually better off with unhurt backup tackles than they were with injured starting tackles. (Especially when the starters were mediocre even when not injured.) Even with the injuries on the OL, the Bills came within a special teams play of beating the Titans. The Titans came within a few feet of winning the Super Bowl. Going from starting OTs to backups is almost always a downgrade. But let's face it--even when our starters were healthy, it's not like we had Tony Boselli out there. Going from John Fina to some backup isn't that big a downgrade, as long as the backup is reasonably respectable. Ditto the RT position. I think the Bills had a good enough overall team that they could have been competitive throughout the playoffs despite the problems on the OL.

You make good points in your post. Trent Dilfer: I agree that even with their defense the Ravens of 200 needed something at QB. Tony Banks clearly failed to provide that something. There was a five stretch during 2000 when the Ravens' offense failed to score a TD. The Ravens went 2-3 during that stretch. The defense couldn't do everything alone. Elvis Grbac was a downgrade from Dilfer; and that downgrade was one of the reasons why the Ravens didn't repeat as Super Bowl champions in 2001. But despite a season-ending injury to Jamal Lewis, the Ravens went 10-6 in 2001, and won a Wildcard game. Would you feel comfortable saying that Elvis Grbac's record for the year was 10-6? I wouldn't. The Ravens as a team went 10-6; and Grbac happened to be part of that team. I acknowledge that a QB's contribution to the team cannot be reduced to the three stats I mentioned (yards per attempt, TD/INT ratio, and QB rating). As you pointed out, Johnson's propensity to take sacks is something that hurt the team without showing up in any of those three stats. In 1999, the Bills had the rookie Peerless Price as the deep threat, and Eric Moulds as the possession WR. The best season of Moulds' career was in 1998; when he had over 1300 yards. (That was also his third year in the league; which is when many WRs finally get it.) The Bills also had Jay Riemersma at TE during the late '90s. Not that he was stellar; but he was a reasonably proficient pass catcher, and a step or two up from any TE the Bills have had recently. (With the possible future exception of Nelson.) At LT the Bills had John Fina who was about the 20th - 22nd best LT in the league at the time. While that was disappointing, it was worlds better than Demitrius Bell. Ruben Brown was a very good LG. The rest of the OL was underwhelming, but at least even there one often saw faint hints of respectability. There are different gradations of bad OL play; and the bad OL play of the late '90s was less bad than the travesty we witnessed in 2009.

Football is a team sport. Whether you win or lose depends on all eleven guys on offense, the eleven guys on defense, eleven guys on special teams, as well as role players and rotational players. To imply that all those players' contributions can be boiled down to the contributions of just one guy at one position (QB) is an insult to the efforts of everyone else on the team. Alternatively, one could argue that one team's supporting cast is very like another's, and that the only real difference between teams is at the QB position. That, however, would be an inaccurate assessment. The Bills of the late '90s--not to mention the Ravens of 2000--had very good defenses. Defenses which were good enough to carry their respective teams; especially in the Ravens' case. A quarterback's individual stats are a much better way of evaluating his performance than is his team's W/L record. But even with individual stats, you have to take into account the talent of his supporting cast; as well as other factors that don't necessarily show up in the stats. For example, Flutie was good at improvising on broken plays; a factor which no doubt helped the Bills' W/L record. But to suggest that the W/L record was due entirely--or even primarily--to Flutie's improvisation would be naive; and would completely ignore the quality of the late '90s Bills defenses. The fact of the matter is that Flutie looked good in '98, but very mediocre and underwhelming in '99, even after his running ability and improvisation are taken into account.

There are several things that could be addressed with your post, but for now I'll focus on the relative comparison of the two QBs' stats. Here they are: Flutie 1999 Yards per attempt: 6.6 TD/INT ratio: 1.2 QB rating: 75.1 There's nothing stellar about any of that. To put this in perspective, consider Edwards' numbers: Trent Edwards (career) Yards per attempt: 6.7 TD/INT ratio: 1.0 QB rating: 77.9 The two QBs put up roughly similar numbers, with Edwards having less receiving talent and (often) outright abysmal pass protection. If with those numbers Edwards is considered backup-caliber only, why should we interpret Flutie's 1999 numbers to mean that he should have had a lock on the starting QB position? Rob Johnson's numbers from 1999 compare very favorably to the other two QBs. (8.8 yards per pass attempt, a QB rating of 119.5, etc.). However, those numbers were based on just two games, so the sample size isn't large enough to be meaningful. A better comparison is to look at Johnson's career numbers. Rob Johnson (career) Yards per attempt: 7.2 TD/INT ratio: 1.3 QB rating: 83.6 Those numbers reflect the fact that Johnson had a more commanding intermediate to deep game than did Flutie. On the other hand, Flutie was a better scrambler, much better at avoiding pressure and making the OL look better than it really was, and had a better short game. I think the Bills should have played Flutie in the first half, when the pass protection was at its worst. (Thus taking advantage of Flutie's strengths/ability to deal with marginal pass protection.) Then in the second half, they should have played Johnson; when the improved pass protection would have allowed his intermediate to deep game to shine.

Both the Bills' OTs were playing hurt that day. On one of the sacks, Jevon Kearse rushed untouched past the Bills' LT to get a sack. It was at that point that Wade realized the starting LT was too hurt to be effective; and so replaced him with a backup. Later that game, something similar happened when Jevon Kearse rushed untouched past the RT to get a sack. Thus leading to the backup RT being inserted, because the starter's mobility had been impacted by injury. So those are at least two sacks Flutie almost certainly would have taken. Overall, I think that Flutie would have done better in the first half--he almost certainly couldn't have done worse!--but that Johnson's second-half performance was better than Flutie's would have been. But the Bills' overall performance should have been enough to come away with a win!! :wallbash: One unorthodox strategy for the Bills to consider would have been to plan to go into each playoff game with Flutie playing the first half, and Johnson playing the second half. As unusual as this might have seemed, it would have had the following advantages: It would have given the other team two different QBs to prepare for; with each QB having a radically different style. Flutie's mobility and short passing game would have allowed him to best deal with the poor pass protection the OL typically provided early in the game. Johnson's intermediate and deep game would have allowed him to benefit from the somewhat improved pass protection the OL provided late in the game, after the other team's DL had become tired. This strategy would have made the two QBs more competitive with each other than they already were; with each guy trying to prove he should be made the full and complete starter. In addition to the above, the Bills should have relied heavily on their running game, so as to better allow their big, slow OL to wear down other teams' (often) small, fast defenses. With a strategy like that, and better special teams play at the end of the Titans game, the Bills almost certainly could have achieved everything the Titans did. And perhaps a little more.

I agree with your post. The Jets were extremely cautious about bringing Sanchez along, and about what they asked him to do. With that OL and that running game, it was a great situation in which he could develop. Just to add to what you've written: Mark Sanchez was drafted fifth overall. At this point in the process, I think that a lot of people are giving him the benefit of the doubt based on his draft position. Also, you don't normally expect rookie QBs to play all that well. So I think his rookie performance is being graded on a curve, and perhaps rightly so. But that said, he will need to significantly improve his level of play if he's going to justify his draft position and sportswriters' high opinion of him.

I looked up the stats for the three QBs in question. Here they are: Edwards 2008 Yards per attempt: 7.2 TD/INT ratio: 1.1 QB rating: 85.4 Henne 2009 Yards per attempt: 6.4 TD/INT ratio: 0.9 QB rating: 75.2 Sanchez 2009 Yards per attempt: 6.7 TD/INT ratio: 0.6 QB rating: 63.0 Edwards 2009 Yards per attempt: 6.4 TD/INT ratio: 0.9 QB rating: 73.8 What I found interesting about those numbers is that even in 2009, Edwards' numbers were about the same as those of Henne and Sanchez. In fact, Edwards' numbers and Henne's for 2009 are basically identical. And yet . . . Edwards did not look like a playoff-caliber QB in 2009--or anywhere close. I think a big part of the reason why Henne and Sanchez are considered better QBs than Edwards is because they're expected to improve; whereas it may be felt that Edwards has plateaued. It's also worth noting that Edwards played without an offensive line, and in an offensive scheme recently derided by Jim Kelly. Sanchez, on the other hand, played behind a really good OL; and Henne's situation was also better than was Edwards'. Possibly, Henne and Sanchez will improve their numbers, and thus justify the high opinions many talking heads have of them. But if their numbers stay the same, I'd conclude that neither the Dolphins nor the Jets would have a first-rate player at QB.

Because the Bills didn't take a QB or a LT early in this draft, they'll be going into the 2010 season without a QB or a LT. Not exactly a recipe for success on offense. Long-term it's quite possible that their drafting strategy will work out well. For example, if they take Ponder in the 2011 draft, and follow that up by trading back into the first for a LT, they might end up with a significantly better QB/LT combination than would have been the case had they gone after those positions this year. Plus they will have added Spiller (best player available when we picked), and Troupe (who hopefully will become a first-rate NT). But the article is about this upcoming season, not the long-term. And in the upcoming season, the Bills very likely will be hurt by poor play at LT and at QB.

I don't have a strong opinion about whether Buffalo or KC should be ranked higher. But if someone did want to justify ranking KC higher than Buffalo, I'd imagine that person would argue the following: While Matt Cassell might not be the long-term answer at QB for KC, he's probably better than any QB on the Bills' roster. This is the second year of Scott Pioli being the Chiefs' GM. Previously, Pioli had been responsible for acquiring the talent the Patriots used for their three Super Bowl wins. The Chiefs now have Charlie Weis and Romeo Crennel as their offensive and defensive coordinators, respectively. That has to count for something right there! The Bills have no offensive line to go with their no quarterback. That combination would seem to suggest certain limitations on offense. Plus, there are no WRs on the roster with any accomplishments at all, except for guys named Lee Evans. The Bills have just switched to a 3-4 defense, which all begins with the NT position. The Bills are using Kyle Williams at NT, even though he's not well-suited to that position. They're also using a rookie; even though rookie DLs typically get off to a slow start. Several other players in the Bills' 3-4 are also playing out of position. Not that the Bills' front-7 had all that much talent even when the guys were playing in position! With Schobel retiring and the departure of TO, the defense and offense each lost one of their best players.

Yes! I'd love to rename myself "Ponder's_Arm" or something like that! Partly because I'm tired of being stuck with a name like Edwards'_Arm, but mostly because it would mean that the Bills would (finally) have a replacement for Jim Kelly. Look at what they did in the past to try to replace Kelly. First they tried to do it on the cheap; using a second round pick on Todd Collins. Then (for some inane reason) they traded a third round pick for Billy Joe Hobart. Did anyone really think that he would be the next Jimbo? After that the decision was made to trade a first and a fourth to Jacksonville for Rob Johnson. While at the same time signing Doug Flutie; so that Flutie could interfere with Johnson's development, and Johnson could interfere with the promise the Bills had made to give Flutie a legitimate shot at the starting gig. After that brilliant experiment had somehow resulted in failure, the Bills wisely chose to trade away yet another first round pick for the aging, second string QB in New England. Other than the first eight games, that experiment didn't produce any results either. In the 2004 draft, TD tried to trade up for Roethlisberger, but was unsuccessful. So after using his first round pick on a WR, TD traded back into the first round for an athletically gifted QB who'd never proved himself as a pocket passer at the college level. Surprisingly enough, Losman was never able to prove himself as a pocket passer in the NFL either, even though he was given plenty of chances to do so. The next plan for the Bills' QB situation was a guy taken in the third round, who (thus far) has produced about the level of play you'd expect from a third round pick. Trent Edwards knows how to dump the ball off, and on occasion has shown more than just that. Eventually he was benched in favor of Ryan Fitzpatrick, for crying out loud! It's a pretty sad state of affairs when even Fitzpatrick outplays you! Now the hopes of many Bills fans are turning to Brohm; a second round pick who'd been released by Green Bay early in his second year. (And who hadn't been claimed off of waivers by anyone else for a period of several weeks or months.) Could that guy be the next Jim Kelly? Maybe, but the odds are heavily against him. The Bills' QB position has been a constant source of pain ever since Kelly hung up his cleats. The time to end that pain is NOW!!! Well, as close to now as possible; which in this case means the 2011 draft. As Bills fans, we should be mentally prepared to do whatever it takes to end the agony and embarrassment at QB; up to and including a 1-15 season in 2010.

When Donte Whitner was drafted 8th overall, I thought it was a clear waste of a valuable draft pick. Nothing that's happened since has changed my mind. But that said, Whitner is still a decent player. Not good enough to be chosen 8th overall by any possible stretch of the imagination; but still an asset to the team. Part of that is that he is (generally) good against the run. The fact that the team as a whole was weak against the run was more because of the front-7 than because of the secondary.

The last Madden game I played was for the Super Nintendo, so you probably know more about that than me. "Franchise mode" sounds interesting, but as you say it only has as much connection to reality as the game designers chose to include. As for reality: I suggest that we talk to Colts fans, and ask them whether getting Peyton Manning was worth the 1-15 season and the associated short-term loss in morale, etc. (Something tells me that having Peyton Manning around is a bonus to the Colts' morale; just as Matt Ryan adds to the Falcons' morale.) For me personally, the long-term benefit of having a franchise QB on the Bills team is more than worth the short-term pain of watching them lose games in the 2010 season. During the year the Patriots had a perfect record (at least during the regular season!), their last game of the year was against the Giants. While the Giants lost that game, they played the Patriots close. They realized that with a few things going differently, they could have won. Even though that game was a loss, it gave the Giants the confidence they needed to win their playoff games and to beat the Patriots in the Super Bowl. Hopefully this year's Bills team will have a lot of games like that.

Some of the players you mentioned would not have been chosen by a good GM. Which, hopefully, the Bills now have. As for guarantees--there's no such thing as a guarantee of anything in football. You could sign a first-rate free agent, in the prime of his career, only to watch him experience severe injuries. (Such as the Takeo Spikes signing for example.) There are no guarantees in the draft either. There's always an element of risk. But the odds of drafting a bust are lowest, and the odds of drafting an elite-level player are highest, early in the draft. Is it worth watching one's team go 1-15 if the reward for that is Peyton Manning? I say yes because--especially for this rebuilding Bills team--the long-term is a lot more important than the short-term. While there's no guarantee of getting a Peyton Manning at any draft position, the probability of obtaining one is highest very early in the first round.