Go Kiko go

That couldn't be more incorrect. "More probable than not" means exactly what it sounds like it means: from the evidence the investigators collected, is it more likely that Brady was aware of the inappropriate activities than it is that Brady was not aware of the inappropriate activities? That is not guessing.

While the report doesn't conclude that Brady directed anyone to do anything, the report does conclude that he was aware that the balls were being deflated below the required PSI values: "Based on the evidence, it also is our view that it is more probable than not that Tom Brady (the quarterback for the Patriots) was at least generally aware of the inappropriate activities of McNally and Jastremski involving the release of air from Patriots game balls."

Why would this be a non-case? Is it possible that a reasonable person could conclude from the evidence in the report that, more likely than not, the locker room attendants violated a league rule, and that, more likely than not, Brady was aware of what they were doing? If so, this would be sufficient for a case to proceed (in some mythical land where violations of NFL rules could be tried in court).

As I mentioned in my other post, "proof" isn't a type of evidence, it's a conclusion. You seem to be using the word "proof" in the same way as that tweet from a few pages back, to refer to what the law calls "direct evidence"--evidence that shows, without the need for any inferences, that some fact exists. But the question--the only question that matters--is whether the evidence that the Wells Report gathered "proves" that these events transpired. Put another way: if the Patriots, or Tom Brady, or these equipment room lackeys were "on trial" and you were on the jury, you would be asked whether, from all the evidence you heard, it is more likely than not that these events occurred. You are not asked whether there was "direct evidence"--"proof", as you used the term--that the events occurred. Here's how a judge would explain this to you if you were sitting on a jury: "There are two types of evidence that you may use in reaching your verdict. One type of evidence is called “direct evidence.” An example of "direct evidence" is when a witness testifies about something that the witness knows through his own senses — something the witness has seen, felt, touched or heard or did. If a witness testified that he saw it raining outside, and you believed him, that would be direct evidence that it was raining. Another form of direct evidence is an exhibit where the fact to be proved is its existence or current condition. The other type of evidence is circumstantial evidence. "Circumstantial evidence" is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another fact. If someone walked into the courtroom wearing a raincoat covered with drops of water and carrying a wet umbrella, that would be circumstantial evidence from which you could conclude that it was raining. You should consider both kinds of evidence that are presented to you. The law makes no distinction in the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. You are to decide how much weight to give any evidence."

You found my post to be a rant? Have you read some of the posts in the previous twenty-six pages? He's using the word "proof" imprecisely--he's using it to mean that there is no "direct evidence" of the events in question. But "proof" is a conclusion, not a type of evidence. According to the Wells Report, the evidence here "proved" that these events occurred. If the circumstantial evidence is "damning," that would seem to mean that the circumstantial evidence "proved" that the events occurred. His only reservation seems to be that there is no "direct" evidence--no witness who could testify that the witness saw a Patriots employee deflate a football below the level mandated by the rules. But as I explained above, the mere fact that there is no direct evidence of that occurring does not affect the conclusion in the Report that the evidence that does exist "proved" that this event occurred.

This. A million times this. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding of what circumstantial evidence means. "Circumstantial evidence," which simply refers to evidence that that is not direct evidence of a fact in question, is not inherently less "valuable" than direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence can be very valuable evidence: if a person walks into a room covered with drops of water and carrying a wet umbrella, that's pretty strong, albeit circumstantial, evidence that it's raining. As the courts say, "the law makes no distinction in the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence." The only question is whether all the evidence, taken together, establishes that it's more likely than not that some event transpired. And as the Wells Report repeats again and again, the evidence here showed that it is more likely than not that these events occurred.

How did the first game turn out? Are you going to show tomorrow's game?

Agreed. The lease appears to have been quite a gift to the city, but the notion that the league or other owners didn't understand the terms of a, relatively speaking, simple and straightforward document stretches the imagination.

I'd be interested to see the article, but generally speaking whether a trust is charitable or non-charitable has no effect on the nature of the trustees' duties vis a vis the trust corpus. Just to take this argument to its logical extreme, could the trustees sell the Bills for $10? I completely agree that Ralph Wilson would have put the trust in place to dispose of his assets in the manner he intended. What I doubt is that, if he intended to impose conditions on the sale of the Bills, he would have left the declaration of trust silent as to this matter and simply hoped that the trustees would decide to impose these conditions themselves. Again, doing so would be a breach of the trustees' duties and could expose the trustees to significant personal liability, risk extensive litigation, and threaten the orderly disposition of the trust corpus. It's simply beyond the bounds of reason that the trustees would act in this manner; Proskauer would not sanction this course of action and would likely terminate their representation in quite a noisy fashion. With regard to the paintings, there is no indication that the executor of Ralph Wilson's estate in any way breached his or her duties. Whether or not a fiduciary properly disposed of their duties is not measured by the outcome of a disposition of an asset; it's measured by the fiduciary's course of conduct. Here, the paintings were sold at a public auction by one of the most prominent auction houses in the world. Which part of that sale demonstrates anything less than an attempt to maximize the proceeds that could be distributed to the beneficiaries?

You've never heard of close family members squabbling over how a dear dead relative's estate is to be distributed? Relatives nearly come to blows over who's going to get the bedroom set; this is a billion-dollar asset, the decisions the trustees make could affect each beneficiary's share by tens of millions of dollars, and the rules the trustees have to follow, if any, are clearly spelled out in the declaration of trust and therefore easy to verify, or litigate. I'm confident that the trustees are doing exactly what Proskauer tells them to do, and they're not going to impose a condition on a high-profile disposition of a valuable and unique asset that they invented out of whole cloth at the risk of being personally liable to the beneficiaries for any loss they cause.

They almost certainly would not, since that could expose the trustees to liability in a suit brought by the beneficiaries of the trust for breaches of their respective fiduciary duties. That being said, it seems more likely than not from all we know that the governing documents of the trust contain some conditions related to keeping the team in Buffalo.

I agree to some extent; many of the posts I have read that claim that the trust won't sell to a relocating buyer have just been ipse dixit. Claims that the trust won't sell to a relocating buyer appear to rest on a few possible grounds: (i) connections that posters have to people involved in the sale process (such as Kirby's post a few posts ago: http://forums.twobillsdrive.com/topic/170168-round-3-sale-of-the-team/page__st__160#entry3230544); (ii) statements made by people involved in the sale process that have been publicly reported; or (iii) assessments that posters have made of the practical difficulties that would be involved in moving the team, which are then used to infer that (a) Ralph Wilson imposed conditions on the trust that limit the trust's ability to sell the team to a relocating buyer, or (b) the trustees, because of these difficulties, would not sell to a relocating buyer (such as in this post: http://forums.twobil...20#entry3229399 and this one: http://forums.twobil...00#entry3229392).

The $400M liquidated damages amount can be thought of as a fallback remedy. If a party breaches a contract, the non-breaching party is entitled to receive what they expected to receive had the contract not been breached. For the county and state, that is having the Bills play in Ralph Wilson Stadium for the term of the lease. Often in the world of contracts, if one party breaches, the other party can be put in the place they would have been if the contract wasn't breached by having the breaching party pay money to the non-breaching party. If you're a small business and order some supplies from another company that fails to deliver, and you have to pay more to go get the supplies from someone else, your supplier who breached can just pay you the extra cost. But sometimes money isn't an adequate substitute for what you were promised in the contract. Imagine a contract to purchase a one-of-a-kind painting, for example. In that case, rather than seeking money damages from the breaching party, you can ask a court to order the breaching party to do something, like follow through with selling you the painting. The Bills are like that painting. Just paying the county and state money doesn't necessarily replace all the intangible things they lose if the Bills leave. So if the Bills breach, the county and state won't go into court asking for the $400M, they'll ask the judge to order the Bills to stay. The $400M is just a fallback in case the judge declines to enter such an order, just like the fallback for not receiving the one-of-a-kind painting would be a payment in the amount of the painting's appraisal.

Unfortunately that's not the case (but that is the correct with regard to what would happen if the Bills tried to move before that date; the Bills couldn't just pay the $400M liquidated damages amount and walk away--the county and state would ask a judge to bar the Bills from playing anywhere else during the lease term, and would have a decent chance of prevailing). The lease provides that the Bills have an option to terminate the lease in 2020. In other words, the parties agreed that the Bills may terminate the lease at that time (for a $28M fee), just like if you agreed with a landlord that you would sign a one-year lease for an apartment, but that you have the right to terminate the lease with 60 days notice. The lease provides that "the Bills shall have the right to terminate this 2013 Stadium Lease effective at 11:59 p.m., Buffalo, New York time as of the Termination Date, provided that the Bills have first (a) delivered to the County and the ECSC, no later than 12:00 noon Buffalo, New York time on the Termination Notice Date, written notice of the Bills' intention to terminate this 2013 Stadium Lease . . . and (b) paid to the ECSC, before the Termination Date, the Termination Fee." Where "Termination Date" is July 30, 2020; "Termination Notice Date" is February 28, 2020; and "Termination Fee" is $28,363,500.

I was not discussing the probability that the Bills will be sold to an owner who will relocate the team. I was responding to the following posts, which were discussing what the Non-Relocation Agreement legally permits the Bills to do. Those are two different topics.

The Bills could talk to potential owners today about plans to move the Bills (to a new stadium or a new geographic area) after the expiration of the current lease (which could be as soon as July 30, 2020, given the one-time termination option). The Bills could also sell to a buyer who intends to move the Bills after the expiration of the current lease. What the Bills can't do is discuss plans to move the Bills before the expiration of the lease, or sell to a buyer who intends to move the Bills before the expiration of the lease. These are the relevant provisions: "[T]he Bills shall not . . . sell, assign, or otherwise transfer the Team to any Person who, to the Bills' knowledge, has an intention to relocate, transfer, or otherwise move the Team during the Non-Relocation Term to a location other than the Stadium" (emphasis mine) "[T]he Bills shall not . . . entertain any offer or proposal to relocate the Team to a location other than the Stadium . . . except . . . to the extent that the relocation or other action . . . would first take effect after the Non-Relocation Term." (emphasis mine) Where "Non-Relocation Term" is defined to mean the period of time lasting until the expiration of the lease of the stadium to the Bills.

If I'm Proskauer, this kind of statement slightly increases my concern that the Bills could breach their lease and non-relocation agreement by continuing to engage in negotiations with the Toronto group, but (i) practically speaking, no one's going to sue the Bills unless the Toronto group's bid is selected, and (ii) the statement ("the ownership group attempting to acquire and move the Buffalo Bills to Toronto") didn't indicate the timing of such a move (while likely a bad idea for all the reasons amply discussed elsewhere on this board, the Toronto group likely could publicly announce that they intend to buy the Bills and move them to Toronto in 2020 without causing the Bills to breach their lease and non-relocation agreement). Of course, the persistent wildcard is that we don't know the terms of the Trust, so we can't really evaluate what impact, if any, this statement would have on the validity of the Toronto group's bid.

That would be excellent. I'm in Brooklyn but I'm planning to move into the East Village when my lease is up in a month and a half. I've done McFadden's but that's not really the scene I'm looking for.

Haha thanks. It's handy that the county makes all the relevant agreements available online. Too bad we can't get at that Declaration of Trust. "Stadium" is defined in the agreement as "The football stadium situated at the Stadium Complex and currently known as 'Ralph Wilson Stadium'", while "Stadium Complex" is in turn defined as "an approximately 197.65 acre parcel of real property situated in the Town of Orchard Park, New York, which parcel is improved by a football stadium and related amenities." For anyone who is particularly curious, you can read the description of the Stadium Complex parcel (including the exception for the "burial ground lot") in an exhibit to the 2013 lease agreement at the following link (page 88 of the PDF): http://www2.erie.gov...greement123.pdf

Based on the version of the non-relocation agreement published on the Erie County web site, the agreement was drafted so that the Bills are obligated to play specifically at Ralph Wilson Stadium. The Bills would breach the agreement if they, among other things: "relocate, transfer or otherwise move the Team (or attempt to relocate, transfer or otherwise move the Team . . . ) to a location other than the Stadium" ("Stadium" being defined as Ralph Wilson Stadium); or "sell, assign or otherwise transfer the Team to any Person who, to the Bills' knowledge, has an intention to relocate, transfer or otherwise move the Team during the Non-Relocation Term to a location other than the Stadium". However, the parties to the relevant parts of the agreement--Erie County, the Erie County Stadium Corporation (the stadium lessee and the sub-lessor of the stadium to the Bills), and the Bills--could, if presented with a proposal to build a new stadium that would be completed prior to the expiration of the non-relocation term, agree to amend the agreement to permit such a plan.