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4th and 4: Hauschka 53 Yard attempt decision - simple analytics


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This is a good breakdown.   I don't see our HC or OC as particularly cerebral guys, probably just go for it on gut feeling.    HausMoney has won several games for us with long bombs, got us in the playoffs by stealing two games with fantastic, clutch kicks.   

 

Facing 4th and 4, I'd have trotted him out too, simply based on his career with us, not his recent struggles.  It's not a 60 yarder we're asking him to hit, its 20 yards longer than an extra point.

 

Another interesting analytic would be average rushing yards gained on 3rd down vs a 5 man front in late game situations where it's assumed you'll be passing.  Andy Reid does this all the time and it works like a charm.   Obvious passing down, less than a minute to go, one (or zero) timeouts.  Spread the field, keep your running back in as a blocker on the play before (we'd prob use Gore in this scenario, they'd think he was there to protect) and then on 3rd and 4 you run a draw play up the middle.   

 

It may not get you into the end zone, but their pass rushers are convinced its a pass and already upfield on the outside and you only have 3 defenders in the entire middle of the field.   Ten yard blast, first down on the 20, run up and spike the ball with 20 seconds left.  Two more chances for to try and score TD but your odds of hitting a FG just went WAY up and you get more chances with a new set of downs.

 

Teams freak out about clock and abandon the run when sometimes it's the perfect call.  Half the passes you complete the guy ends up getting tackled in bounds anyway.  Wish we had some more innovation and experience with game management on our staff.

 

 

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so many coaches can design great systems, coach up their players, call a great game, then totally fall apart when it comes to situational awareness.

 

That's the biggest advantage NE has had for years now. They almost never lose, and when they do it's either to ex Ne assistants (TEN and DET last year) or other long-tenured coaches who tend to be somewhat better than average at this stuff.

 

Andy Reid is the most famous example of this, literally pissing away 1-2 wins a year with terrible clock and situation management. McDermott has been ok, but that end of game sequence was horrible. 

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I understand trying to kick the FG, what I don’t understand is that when we got to FG range there seemed to be no more urgency to go for the win..... Good chance we are gonna get a better FG opportunity if we a atleast tried to play for the TD. It was gutless in my opinion. 

Edited by BananaB
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The team had already failed on fourth down earlier. You have to take the pulse of your own team, not just follow aggregated probability data. We have an offense that is ranked poorly. It's much different for a good or even average offense.

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34 minutes ago, Mark80 said:

30% chance they score a td with 15 seconds left seems way high to me.

I was thinking the same thing. The Bills aren't the Saints. Even 20%, as subsequently suggested, seems very optimistic given what had happened up to that point in the game. With 15 seconds you basically get 2 plays before you have to kick the FG. If I had to guess, I'd say the chances of Buffalo scoring a TD from the 36 yard line in two plays with the Browns guarding the end zone are less than 5%.

Edited by vincec
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1 minute ago, MJS said:

The team had already failed on fourth down earlier. You have to take the pulse of your own team, not just follow aggregated probability data. We have an offense that is ranked poorly. It's much different for a good or even average offense.

Ok let us concede this was McD's mindset. Let us say Hauschka makes the FG. How was McD planning to win in OT with that mindset about  the offensive pulse. Was he hoping for pick 6 or a turnover and have the defense win it for us?

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2 minutes ago, MJS said:

The team had already failed on fourth down earlier. You have to take the pulse of your own team, not just follow aggregated probability data. We have an offense that is ranked poorly. It's much different for a good or even average offense.

 

They just stacked bad decisions.  Rather than a quick out to Beasley, or even one over the middle for a first, throw an ultra low probability pass to Brown, then have to kick from the full distance

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Just now, IgotBILLStopay said:

Ok let us concede this was McD's mindset. Let us say Hauschka makes the FG. How was McD planning to win in OT with that mindset about  the offensive pulse. Was he hoping for pick 6 or a turnover and have the defense win it for us?

 

needs to go to a remedial class of How to Close an NFL Win Like  a Boss

 

that was pitiful, a learning situation hopefully

 

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41 minutes ago, IgotBILLStopay said:

(click on the decision tree picture below to view a bigger version of the image)

 

McD admitted that they talked about whether to go for it on 4th and 4 or attempt the 53 yarder. Obviously they decided on the latter. I am revisiting that decision in this post since it appears very strange from a basic analytics perspective. That decision should be made based on 6 probability assumptions. 

 

1. The probability that Hauschka makes the 53 yarder (he had missed his previous 3 from 50+ yards and missed a 34 yarder earlier in the game - but holds the record for consecutive makes of 50+ yards)

2. The probability that the Bills convert a 4th and 4

3. The probability that the Bills score a TD in 15 seconds with a TO after converting the 4th down

4. The probability that the Hauschka makes a shorter field goal after the conversion on 4th and 4 

5. The probability that Bills win in OT

6. The Browns with a TimeOut and 22 seconds can get in position for a FG and make it

 

Here are my estimates:

 

1. 30% 2. 46% (https://blog.minitab.com/blog/the-statistics-game/calculating-the-probability-of-converting-on-4th-down)  3. 30% 4. 70% 5. 50% 6. 10%

 

image.thumb.png.446c740a3ad5a74ee6c948f90037f904.png

 

That puts the win probability at 13.5 % for the 53 yard try  vs. 25.3% for going for it). The probability of a successful 53 yarder has to be close to 60% for the Bills to be comfortable going for it even keeping other probabilities same (not a given - if one has a 60% confidence in a Hauschka 53 yarder - the probability of a make from a shorter distance will be much higher than the assumed 70% - that will still suggest going for it on 4th down ). Listen - I continue to believe we lucked out in having a great coach who is able to prepare the players well and motivate them to play for each other. That being said, the decision to kick a 53 yarder appears quite short-sighted.

 

Dont the Bills have a basic analytics guy to advise them?

 

 

I think the overall structure and conclusion is sound, but I'm unclear on where you got 70% fail probability for the 53 yards fieldgoal try?

Career, Haushka is 62.8% from 50+ yards.  But, he is 0 for 3 so far this season and IIRC he had a couple misses from >50 yds at the end of last season (?).  So I'm thinking that fail probability is probably higher than 70% yesterday.

 

It's telling that earlier in the game, when we had plenty of time to score more points, the Bills took 2 TOD rather than attempt a 53- and a 56-yd fieldgoal.

To me that says they know 53 yds is wishful thinking for Haushka right now.  And he'd also missed from 34 yards earlier that day!

 

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29 minutes ago, H2o said:

Image result for Brian Daboll says hi

We have a winner.  Also, FWIW, analytics doesn’t account for conditions on the date and time of the kick.  The Bills should have known Hauschka’s max based on pregame testing.  I can tell you for the Redskins it was 49 toward the tunnel end based on the fact that he kissed the crossbar short from 50.  How it was 9 feet further this week on grass and on what looked to be a somewhat slick field with no wind advantage is beyond me. 
 

 Morals of the story: Hauschka is nearing the end.  The play call on third and four was stupid.  And we deserved to lose for botching the sequence at the end.  

1 minute ago, Hapless Bills Fan said:

 

 

I think the overall structure and conclusion is sound, but I'm unclear on where you got 70% fail probability for the 53 yards fieldgoal try?

Career, Haushka is 62.8% from 50+ yards.  But, he is 0 for 3 so far this season and IIRC he had a couple misses from >50 yds at the end of last season (?).  So I'm thinking that fail probability is probably higher than 70% yesterday.

 

It's telling that earlier in the game, when we had plenty of time to score more points, the Bills took 2 TOD rather than attempt a 53- and a 56-yd fieldgoal.

To me that says they know 53 yds is wishful thinking for Haushka right now.  And he'd also missed from 34 yards earlier that day!

 


 

They do.  Watch the warmups about half an hour before the game.  All of this stuff is measured.  

Edited by SectionC3
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13 minutes ago, dorquemada said:

 

They just stacked bad decisions.  Rather than a quick out to Beasley, or even one over the middle for a first, throw an ultra low probability pass to Brown, then have to kick from the full distance

And that's the biggest problem, I feel like. Why have we been passing it deep on 3rd and short? On some of those they didn't even have short crossing routes as an option.

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21 minutes ago, vincec said:

I was thinking the same thing. The Bills aren't the Saints. What is this based on?

 

Successful conversrion of 4th and 4, we are at the 30 yard line with a 1st and 10. The average NFL chance of getting another first down after a 1st and 10 is 66% (read there - I am sure google can provide those). Let us start with 55% for us to move into the red zone (I am ignoring that we can win by scoring a TD).

 

The chance of a TD with a first and 10 from the redzone is 55% plus. https://www.footballoutsiders.com/stat-analysis/2013/closer-look-touchdowns-red-zone

 

55% times 55% gives you 30 %. But as I said in an earlier post - if you believe the chance of a successful conversion are only 20%, the win probability only drops to 22.08%  and is still significantly higher than win probability with kicking a 53 yarder. And if your faith in offense is lower than the above suggested numbers, that will come back to bite you even in the 53 yard attempt part of the decision tree.

13 minutes ago, Hapless Bills Fan said:

 

 

I think the overall structure and conclusion is sound, but I'm unclear on where you got 70% fail probability for the 53 yards fieldgoal try?

Career, Haushka is 62.8% from 50+ yards.  But, he is 0 for 3 so far this season and IIRC he had a couple misses from >50 yds at the end of last season (?).  So I'm thinking that fail probability is probably higher than 70% yesterday.

 

It's telling that earlier in the game, when we had plenty of time to score more points, the Bills took 2 TOD rather than attempt a 53- and a 56-yd fieldgoal.

To me that says they know 53 yds is wishful thinking for Haushka right now.  And he'd also missed from 34 yards earlier that day!

 

Thanks for pointing that out. I was giving McD the benefit of doubt there by assuming a 70% fail probability. If the fail probability is greater (and objectively it is), that only makes the decision to kick appear even weirder. Assuming a 90% fail probability makes the win probability just 4.5 percent for the kicking decision.

Edited by IgotBILLStopay
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6 minutes ago, IgotBILLStopay said:

Thanks for pointing that out. I was giving McD the benefit of doubt there by assuming a 70% fail probability. If the fail probability is greater (and objectively it is), that only makes the decision to kick appear even weirder. Assuming a 90% fail probability makes the win probability just 4.5 percent for the kicking decision.

 

That's about where I got to.  And yet, McDermott has full confidence and faith in Hauschka. 

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39 minutes ago, billsfan714 said:

I was watching the Steelers game and Tomlin going for 4th and 1 from his own 34 with the lead and thinking no way McD makes that call.   Steelers convert, go on a 8 min drive, eating the clock    Ballsy.

McDermott would be 1-8 with that Steelers team.  That’s the difference 

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I get the sense that McD and Daboll are NOT properly communicating on 3rd down plays when there is a potential to go for it on 4th (in the event that the 3rd down conversion is not met).

 

Maybe if Daboll knows that McD is willing to give him the green light to go for it on 4th down if we don't convert 3rd and 4, then maybe the play call is different. That is, maybe running it on 3rd and 4 at least picks up a couple of yards, even if the runner doesn't make it to the 1st down marker. Suddenly, 4th and 1 or 2 looks a lot better than 4th and 4, right?

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9 minutes ago, Crayola64 said:

Even your made up statistics results in only 11% swing.  Which is pretty darn close.

1. I was trying to stack the deck in favor of the kicking decision - so the assumed probabilities are conservative. As pointed out by HaplessBillsFan earlier, the fail percentage on the 53 yarder is likely  greater than 70%. That will make the difference even larger.

2. Dont sneer at 11% my friend - coaches will die for an ex-ante one-play 11% increase in win probability.

6 minutes ago, skibum said:

It was the right call to make, and not even in the top ten worst play calls of the game. Hauschka is capable of making a 52 yarder, just not that one apparently. 

Capable? Yes. Probable? No.

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